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Denial-of-service/distributed denial-of-service (DoS) attacks on network connectivity are 
a threat to businesses that academics and professionals have attempted to address through 
cyber-security practices. However, currently there are no metrics to determine how 
attackers target certain businesses. The purpose of this quantitative study was to address 
this problem by, first, determining differences among business sectors in rates and 
duration of attacks and financial damages from attacks and, second, examining 
relationship among assets and/or revenues and duration of attacks and financial damages. 
Cohen and Felson’s routine activity theory and Cornish and Clarke’s rational choice 
theory served as frameworks as they address the motivations and choices within criminal 
targeted attacks. Using the Kruskal-Wallis test and Spearman’s correlation analysis, data, 
compiled from online database, on 100 U.S. businesses that were attacked in a 19-year 
period were analyzed. Kruskal-Wallis test indicated financial and informational sectors 
had higher attack rates; educational and informational sectors experienced longer attacks; 
and retail and informational sectors suffered greater financial damages. Results of 
Spearman’s correlation showed that there was a significant negative relationship between 
duration and assets across all sectors but a significant positive relationship between 
duration and assets within the financial sector. A key recommendation is for cyber 
security professionals to better understand DoS attacks and to develop protections 
targeted business sectors. The implications of positive social change include the potential 
for security professionals to improve their security defenses from targeted attacks and 
trigger scholars to further research using the issues presented in the study.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study  
 Internet technology has grown from an academic curiosity into a means of 
communication, media distribution (Kende, 2014), knowledge warehousing, and business 
activities (Hunter, 2016). The Internet has become the medium through which denial-of-
service (DoS) and distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks on businesses take place 
(Harris & Maymi, 2016; Lee, 2013). Since the late 1990s, the growth of complex DoS 
attacks on business sectors has corresponded directly with the growth of the Internet and 
its use within diverse services. DoS attacks targeted the availability of services, disrupted 
online access, disabled computer functions, and controlled computing systems remotely 
(Harris & Maymi, 2016).Growth in the number of Internet-enabled devices and Internet 
connectivity across businesses has led to an increase in DoS attacks (Harris & Maymi, 
2016; Sood & Enbody, 2014). Protecting companies from targeted DoS attacks is a 
challenging task that requires diligence and ingenuity, as those who would attack 
Internet-connected systems continue to probe for vulnerabilities and devise new attacks 
(Somal & Virk, 2014). 
DoS attacks have become the most common types of cyber-security attacks in 
business sectors (Conrad, Misenar, & Feldman, 2015). From 2000 to 2019, many 
companies faced repeated challenges to cyber-security from DoS attacks. DoS attacks 
deplete the availability of the targeted companies’ computer systems, whereas a virus 
breaches the systems to search through sensitive data and interrupt normal computing 
operations. DoS attacks are harmful for companies’ networks because they block services 
and prevent authorized users from controlling the system (Harris & Maymi, 2016).  
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 By combining different components of DoS attacks, attackers invade a targeted 
company’s computer systems. Some DoS assaults allow intruders to install malicious 
code onto the target’s systems (Stewart, Chapple, & Gibson, 2015). By using multiple 
and differing vectors, attackers increase their chances of success. The more sophisticated 
the methods used by attackers, the greater their chances of bypassing cyber-security 
defense mechanisms.  
 Since 1990, the study of cyber-attacks has emerged as a crucial and developing 
area in the field of cyber-security. According to Mancuso, Strang, Funke, and Finomore 
(2014), cyber-security research is dominated by operational and attack perspectives. 
Operational perspectives focus on comprehending and expanding cyber-security 
protection. Research within the attack perspective typically focuses on attackers’ 
principles. Some researchers suggested that operational perspectives dominate existing 
research. For example, according to Mulligan and Schneider (2011), most cyber-security 
researchers focused on technological (operational) ways to achieve security. Similarly, 
Jyothsna, Prasad, and Prasad (2011), Ballora, Giacobe, McNeese, and Hall (2012), and 
Langton and Baker (2013) argued that while cyber-security researchers gave attention to 
technical aspects, targeting attacks and attackers received little attention. Uma and 
Padmavathi (2013) highlighted the absence of a common understanding of various forms 
of cyber-attacks, features, and probable outcomes, suggesting a lack of focus on attack 
perspective research. Regardless of whether the operational perspective or attack 
perspective has received more attention, both have limitations as they do not examine the 
metrics of targeted DoS attacks. 
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Despite the abundance of literature on cyber-attacks, including research on 
targeted business sectors types, researchers have generally not examined the relationships 
among DoS attacks, assets, and revenues within specific business sectors (Shakarian, 
Shakarian, & Ruef, 2013). Although few scholars indicated additional research is needed 
(Harris & Maymi, 2016; Yadav & Gour, 2014), the claim of a research gap is supported 
in the literature review where the I describe the existing research on attack metrics in 
detail. I examined the differences among business sectors in attack rates, duration of 
attacks, and financial damages resulting from attacks as well as the relationship between 
company revenues and assets and the duration of attacks and resulting financial damages. 
The study involved compiling and analyzing archival data to identify whether these 
factors were part of candidate targeting metrics, thereby helping cyber-security 
professionals, practitioners, and researchers create higher-level protection and 
management of DoS attacks. The findings from this study on DoS attacks could enlighten 
security professionals, contribute to the advancement of cyber-security theory, and enrich 
the availability of empirical writings on cyber-security. The evolving nature of DoS 
attacks requires continuous vigilance for both large and small businesses (Harris & 
Maymi, 2016). Better understanding of the factors related to DoS attacks (including 
business sector types, assets, and revenues) produced information that could assist future 
research.  
In Chapter 1, I present the background of the study, problem statement, purpose 
of the study, research questions and hypotheses. I also present the theoretical framework, 
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nature of the study, definitions, assumptions, scope and delimitations, limitations, 
significance of the study, and summary. 
Background of the Study 
Targeted computer systems attacks did not begin with the creation of Internet. 
Business sector security attacks started with wiretapping in the 1970s. Attacks on 
computer systems came later, as technology advanced (Moore, 2015). In the 1980s, the 
attacker 414 assaulted as many as 60 different computer systems for unlawful gains 
(Middleton, 2017). Cyber-security attacks of companies continued to increase throughout 
the 1980s (Yar, 2013). A trend of tapping into e-mail systems at both Digital Equipment 
Corp and MCI Communications Corporation emerged, and attackers stole $70 million by 
targeting the financial sector, including the National Bank of Chicago (Middleton, 2017).    
Following the rise in computer system attacks, another trend emerged: virtually injecting 
computers with viruses. By 1991, there were more than 1,000 known viruses in computer 
systems (Yar, 2006). The Melissa virus, which was spread through e-mail messages, 
triggered $500 million in financial damages. Targeted companies and organizations 
included AT&T, Griffith Air Force Base, National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA), and the Korean Atomic Research Institute. In the 1990s, 
attackers breached the computer security systems of the Department of Justice, Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA), and Department of Defense (Hill & Marion, 2016).  
After the 1990s, DoS attackers shifted their focus to attacking the websites of 
company sectors and institutions. A new form of cyber-security attacks surfaced. DoS 
attackers utilized Transmission Control (TCP), Internet Protocol (IP), and User Datagram 
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Protocol for launching attacks. Attackers launched DoS attacks from multiple sources 
(Stewart et al., 2015). The DoS attacks on cyber-security systems were serious in the 
1990s, but the situation worsened in the 2000s when the Internet took center stage in 
technological development and advancement. Attackers coordinated a chain of DoS 
attacks against many e-commerce sites, including AOL, Yahoo!, Amazon, and eBay 
(Bosworth, Kabay, & Whyne, 2014). Cyber-attacks led to financial losses of $8 billion in 
the United States and an average of $1 trillion in cyber-related thefts occurred globally 
each year (Yar, 2006). In contrast, business sector attackers carried out attacks with low 
cost and with advanced technology (Harris & Maymi, 2016). Since 2000, DoS and its 
variant DDoS attacked availability of services on the Internet. Whereas a DoS attack uses 
a single computer and an Internet link to flood a targeted system with packets (unit of 
data), a DDoS attack involves using multiple computers and Internet connections 
(Bosworth & Kabay, 2002; Harris & Maymi, 2016).   
In the 2000s, attackers refined their strategies to target companies by using 
zombie computers (a compromised computer connected to the Internet, used to forward 
transmissions to other computers) to mask the source of the attacks; as many as 37,000 
attempted attacks occurred on the government and private companies (Radware, 2017). 
In the first quarter of 2009, McAfee researchers detected more than 12 million zombies 
(McAfee, 2009). In 2015, over 430 million new malware instances were detected 
(Symantec, 2015). In 2016, CryptoLocker ransomware attacks, which can find and 
encrypt files (see page 31 for a more complete definition and explanation of this kind of 
cyber-attack), were higher than 2015 and the types of ransomware increased by 752% 
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(TrendLabs, 2017). Examining and recording the amount of new malicious code samples 
each day is overwhelming. 
Attackers with malware targeted the Epsilon system, made their way into the e-
mail servers, and obtained the names and e-mails of thousands of clients (Bonner, 2012; 
Vijayan, 2011). Attackers accessed Lockheed Martin’s files and stole information 
(Schwartz, 2011) and breached Target, JPMorgan, and Home Depot security defenses 
(Walters, 2014). Most businesses in the United States continue to fall victim to cyber-
attacks with DoS. The CNN, Yahoo, and Amazon targeted attack rates were around 1 Gb 
per second (Harrison, 2000). In 2013, the DoS attack rate grew to 300 Gb per second 
(Kaur, Kumar, & Bhandari, 2017; Yu, 2014). In the fourth quarter of 2014, DoS attacks 
increased by 57% compared to 2013 (Brenner, 2015). The 2016 DoS attack brought 
down many Internet connections. The magnitude of attack was 1.2 Tbps (York, 2017). 
According to the Kaspersky report (2019), the number of DoS attacks mounted by 84%, 
with the major growth in the number of attacks lasting over 60 minutes. The average 
duration of attacks enlarged by 4.21 times. The size of attacks is larger than ever before. 
The conventional information technology security system offers little protection from 
cyber-criminals using advanced DoS and malware targeted methods to bypass security 
systems. 
The sophistication and growth of cyber-security targeted attacks led scholars to 
examine the applicability of various cyber-security theories, including prevention, risk 
management (Salim, 2014), and general deterrents (Hassan, Reza, & Farkhad, 2015). 
These traditional approaches focused on the nature of attack prevention (Whitman & 
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Mattord, 2016) and have potential limitations. For cyber-crime, researchers (e.g., Holt & 
Bossler, 2014; Leukfeldt, 2014; Holt, 2017) increasingly used Cohen and Felson’s (1979) 
routine activity theory (RAT); the theory is traditionally used to highlight crimes in 
relation to opportunity and action. Researchers also use rational choice theory (RCT) in 
cyber-crime research (e.g., Claude & Siponen, 2014; Exum & Layana, 2016; Homans, 
1961; Hostettler, 2011). The theory derived from an economic principle designed by 
Cornish and Clarke (1987) and examines attackers’ choices from a risk/benefit 
perspective in relation to gains and losses.  
Problem Statement 
The growth of Internet connectivity across the globe has led to an increase in DoS 
targeted attacks (Arora, Kumar, & Sachdeva, 2011; Harris & Maymi, 2016). Since 2000, 
in the United States, business sectors were targeted with DoS attacks at an increasing rate 
of occurrence and cost (Mahjabin, Xiao, Sun, & Jiang, 2017; Nakashima, 2014). Fighting 
cyber-attacks costs organizations over $100 billion annually (Nakashima, 2014), which is 
an unsustainable loss. Further, these attacks continue to threaten organizations with 
billions of dollars in damages (Singer & Friedman, 2014), also unsustainable.  
Although DoS attacks have become the problem of the security of business 
sectors, researchers have focused on examining risks and problems of cyber-security 
(Andress & Winterfeld, 2014; Mulligan & Schneider, 2011). Understanding that cyber-
security has continued to be an emergent area of study, Warkentin and Willison (2009) 
called for the addition of new lenses for criminological studies. Although researchers 
examined risks, cyber-security problems, and DoS attacks (Harris & Maymi, 2016; 
8 
 
Sanghvi & Dahiya, 2013; Sood & Enbody, 2014; Whitman & Mattord, 2016), at the time 
of this study, there were no published research papers that specifically addressed the 
differences among business sector types and rates, duration, and financial damages of 
DoS attacks nor the relationship between company assets and revenues and the duration 
of attacks and the financial damages due to attacks. Knowing the patterns among business 
sector types, company assets and revenues, and the rates and severity of attacks would 
help to address this research gap.  
Existing research on the rates and severity of attacks across business sectors (such 
as Amoroso, 2011; Mahjabin et al., 2017; Tajalizadehkhoob, Asghari, Ganan, & van 
Eeten, 2014) does not focus solely on DoS attacks and has not examined rates and 
severity of attacks beyond a 3-year period (Tajalizadehkhoob et al., 2014), making a 
DoS-focused study that addresses a longer period especially necessary. Such knowledge 
could enable cyber-security professionals to identify targeted sectors and customize their 
approaches in cyber-defense. The general problem for businesses and cyber-security 
professionals is that the continuation of DoS targeting attacks damages business sector 
values financially. The specific problem is that cyber security professions currently 
clearly do not know the metrics that determine how attackers collectively target business 
sectors with DoS and have been unable to protect business from attacks. 
To address this problem, I used quantitative methods to examine the differences 
among business sector types in attack rates, duration of attacks, and financial damages 
resulting from attacks as well as the relationship among company assets and revenues and 
duration of attacks and financial damages. The findings from this study, particularly the 
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findings on differences among business sector types in attack rates, duration of attacks, 
and financial damages, can provide security professionals with information they need to 
more effectively target their attention and spending.  
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study was to examine the difference of attack rates, duration 
of attacks, and their resulting financial damages among business sectors over a 19-year 
period as well as the relationship among company revenues and assets and the duration of 
attacks and the relationship among company revenues and assets and the financial 
damages from attacks, also over a 19-year period. The results of the statistical analyses 
address the research gap and help scholars and cyber-security professionals identify the 
most likely targets of attacks, particularly those that are most damaging in terms of 
duration and financial loss. This study contributes to knowledge about risk factors for 
DoS attacks that could allow cyber security professionals to focus their efforts on 
organizations that are most likely to suffer a DoS attack and to provide possible 
suggestions for organizations to minimize their attractiveness as targets of DoS attacks.  
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
The research questions for this study were specific and formulated based upon 
reliable theoretical analysis. Designing research questions requires a combination of 
practicality and relevancy as the study needs to be testable, suitable for data collection, 
and likely to lead to a useful answer (Singleton & Straits, 2017). Newman and Covrig 
(2013) stated that research questions must be coherent with the purpose of study and 
problem statement. Further, although there is no single best approach to testing a 
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hypothesis, the research hypothesis should be measurable, suitable for intended study, 
and reflect different aspects (Singleton & Straits, 2017). The first three research questions 
(RQs 1, 2, and 3) and hypotheses (e.g., H01: null and Ha1: alternative) for this study deal 
with differences in DoS attacks among business sectors:  
 (RQ1): Between 2000–2019, were there significant differences among business 
sectors in the rate of DoS attacks?  
 (H01): Between 2000–2019, there were no significant differences among business 
sectors in the rate of DoS attacks. 
 (Ha1): Between 2000–2019, there were significant differences among business 
sectors in the rate of DoS attacks. 
RQ2:  Between 2000–2019, were there significant differences among business 
sectors in the duration of DoS attacks?  
H02: Between 2000–2019, there were no significant differences among business 
sectors in the duration of DoS attacks. 
Ha2: Between 2000–2019, there were significant differences among business 
sectors in the duration of DoS attacks. 
RQ3:  Between 2000–2019, were there significant differences among business 
sectors in the financial damage per DoS attack?  
H03: Between 2000–2019, there were no significant differences among business 
sectors in the financial damage per DoS attack. 
Ha3: Between 2000–2019, there were significant differences among business 
sectors in the financial damage per DoS attack. 
11 
 
The remaining two research questions and hypotheses (e.g., H04: null and Ha4, 
Hb4: alternative) for this study deal with the relationship between company assets and 
revenues and attack duration and financial damages: 
RQ4:  Between 2000–2019, within sectors, were there significant relationships 
between company assets and/or revenues and duration of DoS attacks?  
H04: Between 2000–2019, within sectors, there were no significant relationships 
between company assets and/or revenues and the duration of DoS attacks. 
Ha4: Between 2000–2019, within sectors, there was a significant relationship 
between company assets and the duration of DoS attacks. 
Hb4: Between 2000–2019, within sectors, there was a significant relationship 
between company revenues and the duration of DoS attacks. 
RQ5:  Between 2000–2019, within sectors, were there significant relationships 
between company assets and/or revenues and the financial damage 
resulting from DoS attacks?  
H05: Between 2000–2019, within sectors, there were no significant relationships 
between company assets and/or revenues and the financial damage of DoS attacks. 
Ha5: Between 2000–2019, within sectors, there was a significant relationship 
between company assets and the financial damage resulting from DoS attacks. 
Hb5: Between 2000–2019, within sectors, there was a significant relationship 




A theoretical framework is the incorporation and fusion of thoughts that 
researchers distinguish to depict and explain a particular phenomenon (Imenda, 2014).  I 
used RAT and RCT, and cyber-attack (DoS) theory developed by Yar (2005), 
Mandelcorn, Modarres, and Mosle (2013), Tajalizadehkhoob et al. (2014), and Reyns 
(2016) as the theoretical framework for this study. These researchers developed a theory 
to address the gap, limited depth, and absence of other cyber-attack or DoS attack theory. 
Given the similarity between cybercrime or attacks in businesses and social settings, the 
theories advanced in the criminology literature are appropriate for cyber-security 
research, specifically RAT and RCT.   
I used this theoretical framework to examine the research problem in this study.  
This framework has been established as effective in cyber-crime research (Exum & 
Layana, 2016). Researchers use theoretical frameworks to introduce, depict, and illustrate 
the research problem and the significance of the intended practical approach for their 
study. In this study I used a combination of RAT designed by Cohen and Felson (1979) 
and RCT by Cornish and Clarke (1986), to address my assumption that DoS attackers are 
motivated by, and make decisions based on, an evaluation of gains and losses and the 
lack of security defenses. As cyber attacks are multifaceted and their sources are unlikely 
to be adequately described by a single theory, multiple theories can provide more 
effective insight than a single theory. I used RAT and RCT to provide knowledge about 




RAT has traditionally been used to analyze crime based on the premise of an 
attractive target and the opportunity for crime; RCT examines the rational decisions that 
comprise crime or attacks based on costs and benefits or risks and rewards. Combined, 
the use of RAT and RCT allows researchers to examine factors that might influence 
attackers’ choices, particularly as they pertain to choosing targets. This section includes a 
brief synopsis of why RAT and RCT models are appropriate for analyzing DoS attacks 
on targeted companies. A more detailed explanation of the theoretical framework is 
provided in Chapter 2.  
Routine Activity Theory 
The RAT is a branch of crime theory that focuses on the conditions of crimes and 
the elements of crimes that occur. Cohen and Felson (1979), who developed RAT, argued 
that an attack or crime occurs at the convergence of a motivated attacker and an 
appropriate target that is in some way attractive or susceptible. This theory provides a 
macroperception of crime. Attacks are neither unintentional nor frivolous actions, and 
choosing suitable targets is a rational calculation (Cohen & Felson, 1979). The theory 
explains the convergence of motivated attackers with the goal of committing a crime 
against the target. The RAT is an appropriate framework for the study to explain cyber-
attacks. The theory calls for analysis of the specific circumstances for crimes; in the 
terms of this study, an attack occurs when a motivated cyber-attacker and targeted 
business sector are present. In this study, I used RAT to examine the targeted business 




RAT is an analytical method suited for use in real-life situations (Hollis, Felson, 
& Welsh, 2013). According to the theory, a potential attacker must be motivated to 
commit the cyber-crime. The target needs to be the right target from an attacker’s 
perspective and lack effective guardianship, making it vulnerable enough to be a potential 
target. In practical testing of the theory, scholars indicated that it is a good fit in a variety 
of cyber-attacks (Downess, Rock, & McLaughlin, 2016; Felson & Boba, 2010). 
Researchers applied the theory to research on cyber-attacks in virtual spaces (Bolden & 
Nalla, 2014; Holt & Bosler, 2013; Leukfeldt & Yar, 2016; Ngo & Paternoster, 2011). 
RAT is valuable for describing an attacker’s rationale of scanning vulnerable targets to 
deny access using DoS. Further, using RAT as a framework provided an understanding of 
both suitable targets and lack of security.    
Rational Choice Theory 
While RAT can be a useful analytical tool for studying the factors that might 
predispose companies to a cyber-attack, the focus of RCT is choice and decisions 
pertaining to the actual crime (Cornish & Clarke, 1986, 2008). The theory includes an 
assumption that attackers premeditate their actions before they decide to commit an 
attack and that an attack or crime is purposive, intentional, and for the attacker’s benefit 
(Clarke & Cornish, 2001). More specifically, attackers select their targeted sectors to 
fulfill financial or social status desires (Cornish & Clarke, 2008). When applying theories 
from other disciplines to cyber DoS attacks, it is important to seriously consider the 
context to refine the theory for the study setting. As such, I used RCT to study DoS 
attacks by focusing on the attacker perspective (attacker and choice of target).  
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Three main premises of RCT (agent, choice, and opportunity to take action) 
(Cameron & Kornhauser, 2015) were relevant to the current research project because 
they address the elements needed for a cyber-attack to occur in the business sector. The 
RCT first identifies the agent/attackers; specifically, it defines preferences of an attacker. 
Second, it distinguishes the set of choices accessible to the attacker. Third, it detects the 
situation in which the attacker acts (Cornish & Clarke, 1986). Further, Vance and 
Siponen (2012) expanded the RCT for their theoretical model and described that RCT 
can be a good fit for explaining intentional cyber-security crimes and target accessibility.    
As a theoretical foundation, RCT can be used to explain targeting patterns in DoS 
attack rates, as it helps explain the targeting factors such as business sector types and 
values (assets and revenues) in relation to attack rates and duration, and financial 
damages of DoS attacks. Theoretically, businesses that are more attractive will 
experience higher rates, longer durations and greater losses, providing the ideal 
underpinnings for this research. I determined differences among business sectors in attack 
rates, duration of attacks, and financial damages resulting from attacks. I also examined 
the relationship between company assets and revenues and the duration of attacks as well 
as the financial damages resulting from attacks. RAT and RCT was used as the 
theoretical foundation for explaining the results in relation to target value attractiveness.  
Nature of the Study  
This quantitative study involved investigating DoS attacks in the United States 
from 2000 to 2019. Research projects fall into three categories: quantitative, qualitative, 
or mixed methods (Bryman & Bell, 2015). Quantitative methods measure variables and 
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statistically analyze numerical data; qualitative techniques identify and explore meanings 
and interpretations about particular phenomena, including human behaviors (Neuman, 
2011); and mixed method examine various features of a phenomena (Long, 2014). The 
goal of this study is not to explore phenomenon to reveal meanings. Thus, neither a 
qualitative nor mixed method approach was appropriate.  
Quantitative research applies numerical data to focus on particular research 
questions and answer research questions (Neuman, 2011), which was appropriate for this 
study, Quantitative descriptive design was applicable for this research in that I used 
numerical means to determine statistically significant differences between categorical 
variables and answer research questions 1-3. A quantitative correlational design was 
applicable to determine the degree of relationship between variables and answer research 
questions 4 and 5. This quantitative study was not designed to use control groups, the 
manipulation of predicted relationships between variables (Neuman, 2011), 
randomization, or manipulation to predict relationships between variables. This 
quantitative study is neither an experimental nor a quasi-experimental design; neither of 
those approaches were appropriate for this study because it was designed to analyze 
numerical, archival data utilizing computational data methods.  
Based on Singleton and Straits’ (2017) research approach, I used a systematic 
method to gather data on the following five business sectors: educational, financial, 
informational, insurance, and retail. I compiled the data for this study from the following 
archival databases: Computerworld, McAfee, Privacyrights.org, Idtheftcenter.org, 
Avtest.org, IC3, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), U.S. Department of Justice, and 
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Department of Homeland Security reports, Department of Commerce, Library of 
Congress. Archival documents refer to existing data recorded or reported information that 
gives researchers valuable sources of measurement (Singleton & Straits, 2017). 
When randomization and manipulation of independent variable is not possible, ex 
post facto design is suitable to examine the relationship between the dependent and 
independent variables (Ary, Jacobs, & Sorenen, 2010). Ex post facto is a type of 
nonexperimental research in which the researcher measures the statistical differences 
between variables with no way to control extraneous variables. Employing an ex post 
facto research design was necessary for this study because examining DoS attacks in 
real time, would have required collecting data over a very long time span in order to 
examine enough instances to draw conclusions. I examined differences among business 
sectors in attack rates, duration of attacks, and financial damages resulting from attacks, 
which required three the Kruskal-Wallis tests with sector as the independent variable and 
rate of attacks, duration of attacks, and financial damage resulting from attacks as the 
three dependent variables. Correlational research is a type of research in which the 
researcher measures the statistical relationship among variables. I examined the 
relationship between company assets and revenues and the duration of attacks and the 
relationship between company assets and revenues and the financial damages resulting 
from attacks, which required four Spearman correlations with assets and revenues as the 
independent variables and duration of attacks, and financial damage resulting from 
attacks as the three dependent variables. Data was analyzed using Statistical Packages of 
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the Social Sciences (SPSS) version 24, which includes Kruskal-Wallis tests and 
Spearman correlation analyses. 
By examining the difference of attack rates, duration of attacks, and financial 
damages resulting from attacks among business sectors over a 19-year period as well as 
the relationship among company assets and revenues and the duration of attacks and the 
relationship among company assets and revenues and financial damages, the study was 
designed to respond to the problem of cyber security professionals not having adequate 
metrics to determine how attackers target businesses with DoS attacks. The findings from 
this study could enlighten security professionals, contribute to the advancement of cyber-
security theory, and enrich the availability of empirical writings on cyber-security.   
Definitions 
Thorough knowledge of the terms and acronyms used in cyber-security research 
is crucial for understanding the topic. In the field of cyber-security, scholars and 
professionals used several terms to define and describe their activities. To sustain 
methodological accuracy, this section includes key definitions. The main terms for this 
study include the following.  
Attack: An attack is a deliberate effort to launch an assault to exploit a weakness 
of a company’s defense structure to bring destruction, failure, and disrupt normal traffic 
or to make normal network resource unavailable (Stewart et al., 2015). 
 Asset: An asset is everything of monetary value retained by a business that is 
grouped as capital/fixed, current, tangible or intangible and stated in terms of their cash 
value on financial accounts (The Farlex Financial Dictionary, 2017). 
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Business sectors: For this study, businesses are classified as falling into the 
following business sectors: educational, financial, informational, insurance, and retail 
sectors (Langager, 2019). 
Breach: A breach is an act of breaking the defense system of organizations or 
penetrating the system by an attacker (Stewart et al., 2015). 
 Damage: Damage refers to a negative effect on the asset values by denying 
services and it includes both the tangible losses, lost revenue, and other types of damages 
(Palekiene, Bruneckiene, & Simanaviciene, 2014). For this study, I used total damages to 
a company measured by monetary value caused by DoS online business interruption. 
Damage was operationalized as the cost of an individual DoS attack. If there had been 
more than one attack on a given company, the duration was recorded as the average of 
the attacks on that company. 
 Denial-of-Service (DoS): A DoS is a malicious attack that denies an access of 
network connection of a company, making it inaccessible to its intended operators and 
cause the target system to crash, by transmitting a large number of packets from 
Internet protocol address (Soltanian & Amiri, 2016).  
Distributed Denial-of-Service: Is a sophisticated version of DoS and dangerous 
Internet connection attacks with the capability to overwhelm a web server, thereby 
decelerating it down and possibly taking it down entirely (Jaafar, Abdullah, & Ismail, 
2019). 
 Duration of DoS attack: Duration refers to the time, in hours and minutes that a 
DoS takes the system offline and the total legitimate traffic drop and that can be enough 
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to inflict damage at the target site (NSFOCUS, 2017). Duration was operationalized as 
the amount of time of an individual DoS attack, during which the system was offline. If 
there had been more than one attack on a given company, the duration was recorded as 
the average duration of the attacks on that company. 
Hacking: Hacking is the “illegal intrusion into a computer system without the 
permission of the computer owner or user” (Vacca & Rudolph, 2011, p. 22). 
Rate of DoS attacks: Rate was operationalized as the number of attacks on a given 
company (Zhenxin, 2014). For the purpose of this study, because it would be nearly 
impossible to come up with a credible total number of companies in the retail industry, 
the researcher examined the 100 companies (as measured by total workforce) in each of 
the five sectors and “rate” refers to the number attacks on each of those 100 companies in 
the time period under consideration. 
Reconnaissance: Reconnaissance is the act of an unlawful attacker exploring to 
obtain as much information about the computer connection for further potential attacks 
(Agbogun & Ejiga, 2013). 
 Revenue: Revenue is the total amount of income that a given company generated 
from sale of goods and services during a specific period or the amount, in monetary units, 
received during in a given time (Carcello, 2008). 
System compromise: Unlawful admittance to the computer structure or stored data 
(Stewart et al., 2015). 
Vulnerability: A flaw in a computer system that provides easy access to 




One of the vital assumptions for this research is the accuracy of the archival data 
obtained on DoS attacks from Computerworld, McAfee, Privacyrights.org, 
Idtheftcenter.org, Avtest.org, Internet Crime Compliant Center (IC3), FBI, U.S. 
Department of Justice, U.S. Department of Homeland Security reports, and business 
values. The inquiry dataset for this study included data compiled from published reports 
and categorized by year, from 2000 to 2019. The quality of the dataset was dependent on 
the precision of coding. To ensure that the data was accurate, I included a quality 
management mechanism. Coding error detection techniques were in place to ensure the 
reduction of inaccuracies. Privacyrights.org, IC3, and FBI provide data considered by 
some researchers to be more precise and reliable than data gained by surveys, under the 
assumption that the data collected from business sectors only apply to DoS attacks. 
Another assumption, directly related to the theoretical framework of this study is that 
DoS attackers identify their targeted business sectors based on business factors.  
Scope and Delimitations  
The scope of this dissertation study is bounded by DoS attacks within selected 
business sectors in the United States over a 19-year period. The data were compiled from 
the databases listed above and company websites. I included only the five business 
sectors identified as having suffered DoS attacks and examined only external DoS attacks 
that directly interrupted networking. To answer the research questions, I compiled a 
dataset from archival reports on DoS attacks and company financial assets and values.  
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As delimitations denote prearranged constraints to manage data (Sampson et al., 
2014), to be feasible this quantitative study required certain delimitations. The most 
important delimitation was that I only examined the 100 organizations in each sector. 
This resulted in examination of 500 organizations, 100 that had experienced DoS attacks 
and 400 that had not. Within the insurance sector, only two organizations had been 
attacked, which excluded this sector from some of the analyses. Because some sectors, 
such as retail, include thousands of organizations, many of them very small, it was 
impractical to randomly select organizations for inclusion in the study.  
A second delimitation was that the study included only five business sectors and 
so generalizations could not be extended to other business sectors. Specifically, other 
types of malicious code attacks and techniques, such as Cross-site Script, Structural 
Query Language injection, phishing, sniffing, spoofing, eavesdropping, Data breach, and 
ransomware attacks were beyond the scope of this study. Further, because of the vastness 
of the topic, this study included a background paradigm limited to that which is useful to 
understanding the research questions. In this study, the potential issues of generalizability 
were properly addressed. To ensure generalizability, several facets of measurement error 
were isolated and eliminated. 
Limitations 
Limitations are weak points that a researcher cannot control and inappropriately 
influence the result of the study (Yin, 2014). Although this study deals with DoS attacks 
for a 19-year period, this does not include unsuccessful attempts at DoS attacks, it only 
deals with successful DoS attacks that disrupted systems and caused financial loss. 
23 
 
Businesses targeted with attempted DOS attacks do not always make their reports 
available to the public. 
I employed ex post facto research, which is a type of nonexperimental research 
in which the researcher studies events that have already happened with no way to 
control extraneous variables. The study was also limited to the archival data of the 
business sectors with DoS attacks during 2000- 2019 in the United States. Another 
possible limitation of the study is that the data sources may not have contained 
information about all DoS attacks occurred in the U.S. There is a possibility that an 
important variable was missing. A final limitation is that this is an archival study, and so 
it looked backward at the relationships between the dependent and independent variables 
in the past (2000-2019). The continuing relationships was ultimately needed to be 
verified with data obtained from future DoS attacks. 
Significance of the Study 
While there is a large quantity of literature on cyber-attacks, this research adds to 
the literature by filling a gap in network and security management literature with regard 
to DoS targeted attacks analysis. The findings from this research are applicable to 
researchers, government agencies, and organizations. The study findings include 
information valuable to organizations, cyber-security professionals, practitioners, and 
researchers about DoS targeted attacks. I determined differences among business sectors 
in attack rates, duration of attacks, and financial damages resulting from attacks. I also 
examined the relationship between company assets and revenues and the duration of 
attacks as well as the relationship between company assets and the financial damages 
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resulting from attacks. This information could serve as a reference for industry 
practitioners and academic researchers in the field of cyber-security attacks. Addressing a 
research gap in a field that lacks a unified theory pertaining to cyber-attacks is useful in 
real-world applications. By increasing the specificity of the dependent variables beyond 
those used in previous studies, this study provides a clearer picture of attack rates, 
duration, and financial loss across business sector types and in relation to company 
variables, such as revenues and assets. This increased knowledge is a step toward 
successful development of holistic approaches to understand types of sectors likely to be 
targeted and to identify specific businesses within sectors that are more likely to be a 
victim of financial damages. 
The findings from this study can inform business managers, information 
technology specialists as well as researchers at large. Studying DoS attacks helps build 
knowledge necessary for developing appropriate defense and reducing the risks of 
attacks. The study’s significance extends further to expand identifying targeted business 
sectors and rates of attack per sector for 19 years. The relatively long time period for this 
study was chosen because DoS attacks are somewhat infrequent. With five business 
sectors, the 19-year period was necessary in order to have a base of 100 DoS attacks to 
examine. 
Significance to Theory 
The paradigms for this study were RAT and RCT, which are basic theoretical 
methods in criminology. These theories provided an appropriate framework for studying 
the DoS-targeted business sectors attacks as they can be used to examine factors related 
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to attackers, target attractiveness, and lack of guardians. I used the selected theories for 
this study to explain differences among business sectors in attack rates, duration of 
attacks, and financial damages resulting from attacks as well as the relationship between 
company assets and revenues and the duration of attacks and financial damages resulting 
from attacks. I used RAT and RCT to interpret findings concerning target attractiveness 
and rates of DoS attacks, duration of the attacks, and the financial damages resulting from 
these attacks. Previous RAT and RCT studies often focus on motivation in relation to 
gaining money, status, and benefits on targeted attacks. While all RAT and RCT 
propositions are essentially hypotheses themselves, only selecting the targeted industries 
and companies lends itself to more explicit and better testable hypotheses when employed 
in the context of DoS attacks.  
While assets and revenues are both standard attractiveness factors, this researcher 
also considers whether these factors vary in significance by sector. I expanded the 
theories by considering other types of motivations on DoS targeted attacks and 
underlining the specificity of RCT and RAT in terms of cyber-security attack artifact in 
theory development. A new approach using RAT and RCT expands these theories to 
cyber-attacks so others can use them differently in the future.  
Significance to Practice  
Modern cyber-attackers are patient and remain in the system as long as they can 
without being noticed; these attacks differ from traditional crime activities where the 
offender would conduct the offense and disappear as soon as possible. In this case, the 
contemporary criminals follow procedures that are difficult to understand. The current 
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cyber-crime threat is persistent (Harris & Maymi, 2016). Applying theories to the 
changing nature of attacks provides practical knowledge.  
I advanced practical awareness by investigating the cyber-attacks from the 
attacker’s standpoint in relation to target attractiveness. The findings assist a cyber-
security investigator in knowing what kinds of targets are likely to be perceived as 
suitable. Others could use these findings to prevent future cyber-crimes. Business leaders 
and information security specialists who manage cyber-security risks could use the 
findings from this research to identify targeted sector types and improve security 
practices. Business owners could utilize findings from this research to devise new 
approaches to handling strategic priorities related to DoS attacks building more effective 
layered defenses.  
Significance to Social Change 
This research study is important to various parts of society, particularly to cyber-
security practitioners. The combined theories of RAT and RCT can be used to interpret 
findings in relation to targeted business sectors. This knowledge can assist cyber-security 
practitioners in reducing cyber-criminal activities, increasing company defense system 
control measures, and minimizing the likelihood of a cyber-attack happening. The 
information and knowledge obtained as an outcome of this research could improve 
information systems management’s understanding of the risk of attack for targeted 
business sectors and holds the potential for positive social change through decreasing 
DoS attacks. This study is useful for security professionals to gain knowledge that could 




DoS attacks are more complicated and threatening than previously thought. These 
attacks will increase in speed, diffusion, and power if action does not take place. The 
dynamism of these attacks continues to be the biggest threat to cyber-security in business, 
as it is almost impossible to know how to design an effective defense. Even though 
researchers studied DoS attacks incidents for years, no clear-cut solution has appeared. 
Researchers and organizational leaders attempted to find ways to protect 
companies’ cyber-infrastructure from DoS attacks. However, no line of defense emerged 
as entirely effective. It is important to understand differences among business sectors in 
attack rates, duration of attacks, and financial damages resulting from attacks as well as 
the relationship between company assets and revenues and the duration of attacks and the 
relationship between company assets and revenues and the financial damages resulting 
from attacks.  
This chapter included a review of the threats posed by DoS attacks and several 
challenges faced by academics and cyber-security professionals looking to understand 
and mitigate these attacks. The chapter also included the research questions. Chapter 2 
will include a comprehensive review of the literature surrounding DoS attacks and the 
theoretical frames. Chapter 3 will include the research design, data collection method, 
and strategy for data analysis. Chapter 4 will include the results of the analysis of DoS 
attacks and an interpretation of the statistical findings. Chapter 5 will include the 
rationale of this study and the interpretation of the outcomes. This final chapter will also 
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include implications for social change based on the study of DoS attacks in cyber-
security and recommendations for future study. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
My goal for this literature review is to describe the existing research on targeted 
business sector attacks with DoS. This review includes a comparison of the findings from 
previous DoS attack literature (including attackers) with specific attention to types of 
attacks, financial damages, and theoretical foundations. This chapter includes a 
discussion of DoS attacks and cyber-security in order to demonstrate a need for the 
current study and to show a connection to the problem statement and purpose presented 
in Chapter 1.  
This review includes literature on business sector cyber-security attacks with DoS 
and background information on attacks, attackers, the attacking process, and cyber-
security in general. I also include an outline of existing research on targeted attacks, the 
motivation of attacks, target attractiveness, targeted business sectors, and financial 
damages. Finally, I describe existing attack metrics. In this review, I explore all these 
components in terms of potential DoS attacks in targeting business sectors’ values. A 
number of related topics about denial of service and data breach attacks are included. 
These topics contained network, computer, and vulnerability attacks and the nature of 
DoS and their attack systems. Pertinent literature on DoS, including categories, 
techniques, types, targets, and tools of attacks are reviewed and synthesized. I assess and 
compare the similarities and differences of researchers’ approaches and offer an extended 
review of the two theoretical frames of this study: RAT and RCT. This subsection of the 
chapter includes information about the background of these theories, their key premises, 
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and their application to both cyber-crime and this study in particular. Finally, this chapter 
includes highlights of the benefit of using these theories in combination.  
As researchers conduct literature reviews “to identify theories, and findings [and] 
gaps in knowledge in that research area” (Bhattacherjee, 2012, p. 21), this chapter 
includes a systematic investigation of theories, findings, and gaps in the literature on DoS 
attacks based on an evaluation of ideas promoted by Singleton and Straits (2017). These 
authors recommended using logic to review literature related to a research problem, the 
purpose of a study, and the research questions and to explore and analyze basic account 
information. The literature review also includes recent scholarly works that include the 
theoretical and methodological input.  
As cyber-security has become a new field of study, finding theoretically and 
empirically advanced, well-researched, and unified literature on this research topic is 
challenging. The focus is on academic and peer-reviewed articles from various sources, 
with attention to taxonomies of DoS attacks. The theoretical background for this 
literature review includes recent literature pertinent to cyber-security attacks. I used the 
Library of Congress (books, peer-reviewed articles, journals, newspapers), local 
university libraries, and computerized databases and resources, such as EBSCO, 
ProQuest Dissertations, and the Google search engine to find applicable materials on the 
topic of DoS attacks. Key search terms were used cyber-attack, DoS, data breach, 
information systems attacks, network security attacks, security incidents, routine activity 




The developers of RAT), Cohen and Felson (1979), stated that attacks occur when 
there is an attacker and a target in the absence of security. But one question that arises 
when conducting research on targeting business sectors with DoS attacks is what an 
attack or cyber-attack entails. In general, a cyber-attack is an assault launched from a single 
computer or multiple computer systems against another computer system\ to disrupt 
communications or to gain data. In 2009, analysts at the National Research Council 
presented a description of attacks as “deliberate actions to alter, disrupt, deceive, degrade, 
or destroy computer systems or networks or the information and/or programs resident in 
or transiting these systems or networks” (p. 1). Kesan and Hayes (2012) attempted to 
offer insight into the legal issues related to attacks and found that researchers felt uneasy 
about expressing the differences between cyber-attacks, cyber-exploitation, or cyber-
intrusion. Hathaway et al. (2012) defined a cyber-attack with DoS as an attack that 
encompasses any engagement to destabilize the operation of a communication system for 
a government or public protection principle. According to Uma and Padmavathi (2013), a 
cyber-attack is any technique used to disrupt the Internet communication or structure. 
Uma and Padmavathi’s understanding of an attack included the breakdown of a computer 
defense network structure.  
From a more technical point of view, Conrad et al. (2015) referred to an attack as 
an intentional act against computer components or a computer system that aims to 
destroy, deny access to, or degrade the system. An attack with DoS is a deliberate attempt 
to manipulate computer systems and networks (making these attacks well-suited to 
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analysis using the RCT and the result of the action may be cyber-crimes. Harris and 
Maymi (2016) focused on process when describing an attack as the deliberate act of 
tracking someone’s movements without his or her authorization or knowledge that leads 
to a breach in the information system. The skills and technology employed in executing 
attacks are similar to those used in cyber-exploitation, yet the objectives of each action 
are different. Attacks result in dysfunction, as attackers try to render the computer system 
and networks untrustworthy and unavailable.  
Attacks with DoS are asymmetric, stealthy, and evolving; an individual, group, or 
state located anywhere on the globe can deny access to, or breach, the computer system. 
According to Clarke and Knake (2010), attacks exist in a global system, and they can 
occur quickly at any time. Clarke and Knake stressed the ability of an attack to obliterate 
private and government computer infrastructures by providing examples of attack 
scenarios triggered by DoS. Although Clarke and Knake made some important points, it 
is difficult to confirm the credibility of their assertions or to know the source of an attack. 
The explanation for attacks is inadequate for real-world applications. Despite these 
limitations, scholars make similar arguments, including that no private or government 
cyber-infrastructure has protection from multifaceted attacks in the electronic era (Yu, 
2014). Part of the complication of protecting against attacks can be tied to questions of 
responsibility. Sales (2013) noted that researchers had not sufficiently tackled the issue of 
cyber-security because “most scholars understand cyber-attacks as a problem of either the 
criminal law or the law of armed conflict” (p. 1503). The focus of most research is on 
attack behavior rather than the metrics and mechanism of cyber-attack target choices. An 
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attack can be separated into two forms or categories: an attack in which the aim is to impede 
the target computers or one in which the aim is to breach the systems to get information from 
the computer.  
Type of Attacks 
To understand how attackers target companies with DoS, it is necessary to 
classify the various types of attacks. Attacks on the cyber-security systems of 
organizations can take many different forms. This study involved examining DoS attacks, 
which form most attacks against businesses. To find a solution to computer and network 
insecurity, scholars proposed taxonomy systems for attacks. 
Hansman and Hunt (2005) developed a taxonomy comprised of four computer 
attack dimensions. The first dimension deals with the attack vector or the path by which 
malicious code gets to its targets. The second dimension, attack target, indicates whether 
the attack is aimed at hardware or software targets. The third dimension consists of the 
type of vulnerability that attackers exploit. The final dimension is the attack payload, 
which refers to the risk or effect associated with the attack. Chabinsky (2010) examined 
the attack vector on its own and classified attacks into supply chain, remote access, and 
proximity access based on the type of access that the attackers use to gain unauthorized 
entry into a system or network.  
Kjaerland (2005) classified attacks based on incident reports. The first category is 
the attack’s source area, such as .com or .gov (Kjaerland, 2005). The second category is 
the techniques of the attack, such as a virus or DoS (Kjaerland, 2005). The third category 
is the impact that the attack has on the system, and the fourth is the services targeted by 
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the attack (Kjaerland, 2005). Harris and Maymi (2016) suggested adding Domain Name 
System cache poisoning to the list of the types of cyber-attacks because that type of 
attack interrupts a service and damages systems. 
Researchers attempted to classify DoS security attacks on companies more 
precisely, including bandwidth flooding attacks, penetration attacks, cyber-infrastructure 
attacks, and electronic warfare attacks (Conrad et al., 2015; Harris & Maymi, 2016). 
Somal and Virk (2014) examined the history, trends, and strategies of a wide range of 
DoS attacks across and categorized these attacks by level of mechanization, the assault 
pace, and the attack impact. The study highlighted how DoS attacks became a complex 
and serious problem for businesses and identified various approaches proposed to counter 
them. Harris and Maymi (2016) and Conrad et al. (2015) also addressed the attacks that 
come from DoS, virus, and worm attacks. Because researchers do not use one common 
taxonomy to address business sector attacks, this study included the models that Harris 
and Maymi (2016) and Conrad et al. (2015) used to classify the different types of DoS 
attacks and other types of cyber attacks. 
Malware Attacks 
Like a DoS attack, a malware attack is a type of cyber-security attack against a 
company’s values. Malicious software attacks involve attempts to identify targets’ 
components and infect their systems. Both Harris and Maymi (2016) and Conrad et al. 
(2015) described malware as a generic term that comprises all types of harmful software, 
including computer viruses, worms, Trojan horses, spyware, logic bombs, key loggers, 
shareware, backdoors, botnet code, and root kits. Attackers can use various types of 
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malware viruses and worms to manage a system (Conrad et al., 2015; Harris & Maymi, 
2016). The malware works by affecting the integrity of stored data or information, as well 
as the entire system (Conrad et al., 2015; Harris & Maymi, 2016). Malware attackers put 
destructive software into use to conduct activities that can harm electronic 
communication.  
Unlike a DoS attack, malware resources can customize content delivery to a 
victim. The complexity of malware is increasing, and it can often access its target system 
without detection to gather information. According to Rajab, Zarfoss, Monrose, and 
Terzis (2006) and Pinguelo and Muller (2011), malware programs gather personal data, 
store and distribute illegal content, and attack computer and network systems. Beyond 
personal computers, malware programs can also attack and cripple infrastructures.  
Cryptolocker 
Cryptolocker is one of the most popular types of ransomware that launches 
attacks on business computer systems via spam messages, drive-by downloads, watering 
hole, and spear phishing (Jarvis, 2014; Stewart et al., 2015). Spammed messages come 
with attachments, which contain Cryptolocker malware. The malware installs into the 
computer through downloading the file attachments (Pathak, 2016). Upon launching an 
attack on a computer, every file and document in the infected computer becomes 
encrypted, blocking the normal user access. This is followed up with a message pop-up, 
detailing potential damage to the documents and files; the rightful computer owner has to 
pay a ransom in order to be issued the decryption key (Thakkar, 2014). Patil (2017) 
acknowledged that Cryptolocker, an active Trojan horse, was the initial cyber-attack that 
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used public-key encryption. According to Kansagra, Kumhar, and Jha (2016), 
Cryptolocker functions by integrating RSA-2048 and AES-256 encryption to lock files 
and documents of victims. The use of RSA-2048 encryption makes it a difficult for 
rightful computer users to obtain the RSA-2048 key as it takes approximately 6.4 
quadrillion years to crack the key.  
Cryptolocker attackers lock files and documents rather than focusing on system 
destruction. After inhibiting file access, the criminals then demand the users to pay a sum 
of money; failure to pay results in obliteration of the encryption key to permanently erase 
the user’s data (Stewart et al., 2015). According to Patil (2017), the cyber-attackers 
withhold the decryption keys as they demand sum of money to be paid via MoneyPak or 
Bitcoin within the time limit, after which they assert to destroy the decryption keys. 
Pathak (2016) explained that Cryptolocker attackers, as other cyber-criminals, mainly 
target business organizations by launching attacks through spam e-mails. These e-mails 
are often sent as complaints by customers. Cryptolocker inhibits users from accessing the 
computer system unlike DoS, which blocks the networking system of the users. In the 
wake of increasing cyber-security threats, the business community is at risk of losing data 
that are the backbone of everyday business operations and organizational success. As 
such, information system specialists face the challenge of developing decryption keys to 




Denial-of-Services/Distributed Denial-of-Services Attack 
DoS attacks are one kind of cyber-security attack used against business sectors. 
For several years, DoS attacks did not receive attention. However, the trend changed in 
2011 as attackers began using DoS as one of their main attack methods (Kesan & Hayes, 
2012; Patil & Kulkarni, 2011). By 2012, DoS attacks became a part of the cyber-security 
landscape. In 2017, 6.9 million attacks by DoS, which were not at all selective and cut 
across all sectors, were registered; in October of that year 22,622 attacks were registered 
per day (Whalen, 2017). The present study dealt only with the tiny fraction of those 
attempts that actually resulted in denial of service. 
DoS attack operations have several vectors and often occur over an extended 
period. Their advanced and multifarious nature has produced security challenges for 
companies. Attackers use various methods to attack and gain control of computers. 
Traditional security devices such as firewalls, IDSs, and antivirus software programs are 
not effective in defending against DoS attacks that forward extra traffic to a network 
address (Harris & Maymi, 2016).  
Harris and Maymi (2016) addressed some similarities and differences between 
DoS and DDoS. Whereas a DoS attack involves using a single computer and an Internet 
link to flood a server with packets, a DDoS attack involves using multiple computers and 
Internet connections, which makes it more difficult to deflect. Harris and Maymi noted 
that DDoS attacks send voluminous packets in large numbers to consume a larger part of 
the network’s bandwidth. DoS attacks do not depend on an Internet protocol. The most 
widespread type of DoS attack is the packet flooding attack. Flooding attacks consume 
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the target resources by flooding the system with an overwhelming number of packets 
(Harris & Maymi, 2016). Arora et al. (2011) and Conrad et al. (2015) indicated that the 
common goal of DoS attacks is to use up the target system’s availability to legitimate 
users. The danger of DoS attacks is higher in a DDoS attack because DDoS attacks 
include massive botnets (Imperva, 2012).  
DoS attacks against companies’ systems have become more complex. Anstee 
(2013) described escalating attacks over the years. These attacks occur at a speed greater 
than 10 and 20 gigabytes per second (Gbps), and they take place numerous times each 
day. Schwartz’s (2013) description of the growth of DoS attacks aligned with Anstee’s 
description: the average speed of attacks has increased from 6 Gbps to 48 Gbps, and 10% 
of all DoS attacks exceed 60 Gbps. The growth in number and severity of DoS attacks 
may result in financial damage to companies. Usually, DoS attackers focus on sending a 
flood of packets rather than breaching the privacy and integrity of the data (Kashyap & 
Jena, 2012). 
Even though researchers agreed that DoS attacks involve the interruption of 
servers, they examined the nature of DoS in various ways. Mahjabin et al. (2017) 
discussed the different forms, strategies, and processes of DoS and examined 
architectures used in attacks, but it was Patel and Borisagar (2012) who designed the DoS 
taxonomy. Conrad et al. (2015) and Harris and Maymi (2016) reviewed functional 
mechanisms of DoS attacks. In a larger context, Yu (2014) provided an understanding of 
the emerging issues in the field of DoS attacks and information relating to how DoS 




The smurf attack is one common type of DoS attack against companies’ network 
systems. Smurf attacks can prevent legitimate traffic by creating an overwhelming 
number of pings and resulting echoes directed toward the victim’s IP address. According 
to Conrad et al. (2015), to perform a smurf attack, an attacker pings a directed broadcast 
address on the Internet with the address forged as being from the victim. The computer 
then becomes unresponsive due to the creation of high computer network traffic on the 
victim’s network. Smurf attacks flood the target with Internet control message protocol 
(ICMP) echo packets. The spoofed network packet sent from the smurf program includes 
an ICMP ping. There are similarities between Harris and Maymi’s (2016) and Conrad et 
al. (2015)’s research on the nature of smurf attacks. However, Harris and Maymi added 
the attacker, the victim, and the amplifying network to their research.  
Fraggle Attack 
Like the smurf attack, the fraggle attack is a type of flooding attack. Attackers of 
both types of attacks send packets to a network amplifier. However, fraggle attacks use 
user datagram protocol (UDP) echo packets instead of the ICMP echo used by the smurf 
attack (Conrad et al., 2015; Harris & Maymi, 2016). A fraggle attack is a DoS attack that 
works when attackers broadcast a spoofed UDP packet to the amplifying network, which 
responds by replying to the victim’s system (Harris & Maymi, 2016).  
SYN Flood Attack 
Like smurf and fraggle attacks, synchronization (SYN) attacks involve flooding. 
A SYN flood attack depletes protocol data construction on the server side by sending a 
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constant stream of requests to the transfer control protocol (TCP) link from external 
hosts. In this manner, the servers must match resources to every new connection, thereby 
using all of its resources (Conrad et al., 2015). A SYN flooding attack involves 
constantly sending packets to each port on the server using a bogus IP address to exhaust 
the connection resources. In this situation, a hostile user may exploit a half-open 
connection and gain access to the target’s server. Smurf, fraggle, and SYN flood attacks 
involve attempts to disable the target networks. In these attacks, the server loses or cannot 
process a real connection. 
The Ping-of-Death Attack 
The ping of death involves sending a malformed ping to a computer with an intent 
to attack the destination host server. Conrad et al. (2015) and Harris and Maymi (2016) 
provided similar descriptions of the nature of the ping-of-death attack. A typical server 
attack involves the flooding of ping traffic on a single server in such a way that the 
regular traffic fails to reach the target computer system (Conrad et al., 2015; Harris & 
Maymi, 2016). According to Stewart et al. (2015), sending a ping larger than the TCP/IP 
requirement packet size (65,535) could crush the destination server. The ICMP echo 
requests of a packet size greater than the standard IP packet size cripple the victim’s 
server, and the victim cannot reassemble the packets. The ping-of-death attack is easy to 
implement using the ping application packaged with any operating system. 
The Teardrop Attack 
Teardrop attacks generally involve manipulating fragmented IP packages. 
According to Conrad et al. (2015) and Harris and Maymi (2016), teardrop attacks usually 
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exploit the overlapping fragment bug on computers with operating systems such as 
Windows NT and Windows 95. The bug causes the IP fragmentation assembly code to 
malfunction by failing to coordinate the overlapping IP fragments. Severe damage can 
occur because computer users fail to save their data in open applications. Teardrop 
attacks can crash the systems and there is a chance of losing unsaved data on the affected 
computer.  
Launching DDoS Attacks 
The complexity of attacks and the volume of traffic necessary to block and 
control a target system increased. The Mariposa and Kroxxu botnets are just two of the 
many hundreds of similar botnets, and the scale of similar botnets can run to 10s of 
millions of hosts. The Mariposa botnet, for instance, infected over 13 million computers 
(McMillan, 2010). In 2016, a massive flooded DoS attack occurred. A domain name 
service business was flooded by 1.2 Tbps of traffic, the most massive of DoS traffic ever 
documented (McAfee, 2017).  
Alomari, Manickam, Gupta, Karuppayah, and Alfaris (2012) and Yu (2014) 
explained forms and launching techniques of DDoS attacks. The bandwidth depletion 
attack involves sending harmful traffic to a target’s system to prevent the target from 
accessing the legal traffic. This type of attack can be categorized into amplification and 
flood attacks. Further, according to Malik (2016), the amplification assault includes 
sending the message to a broadcast IP address to cause harmful traffic resulting from 
messages being sent via broadcast in the target’s system. As the harmful traffic increases, 
the target’s bandwidth becomes low. The attackers send large floods of traffic to the 
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target’s system bandwidth using robots (zombies) to cause congestion in the network and 
with the traffic of the IP. Because the bandwidth is saturated, the target’s network 
becomes slow or crashes. Amplification attack is associated with an attacker or zombies 
sending packets to scattered IP addresses. These attacks cause all network systems on the 
subnet to be accessible by the multiple user IP locations to access packets to the target’s 
network. Somal and Virk (2014) stated that the flooding attack increases unwanted 
network traffic that leads to a reduction in the victim system’s bandwidth. User datagram 
protocol (UDP) and Internet control message protocol (ICMP) packets are used to launch 
this type of attack. In the UDP method of flood attack, a large number of packets are 
randomly sent to the target’s network, and the system tries to respond to the packets as 
incoming requests. If the target’s system is not running any applications on the port, a 
message of the port not being reachable is sent by ICMP packet. 
Alomari et al. (2012) and Malik (2016) described that a resource attack is 
achieved through limiting the user’s requirements to access the network. This type of 
attack is aimed at the core of a network where all processes are done. An attacker sends 
messages that include the guiding communications in a network. Requirements for usage 
in the network are shut down. In attacks in TCP SYN, the initiator of the attack is the one 
who sends instructions and directions to the user’s system so that the requests by the user 
are not responded to. IP address packets consist of similar message sources and 
destinations of the recipient addresses. This type of attack leads to confusion in the 
victim’s system, which can result in the system crashing.  
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DoS crushes the targeted system by sending packets to the system of the victim. 
DoS attacks are performed by using large volumes of traffic to deplete the bandwidth, 
OS, and computing power of victim systems. The quality of the victim system is 
degraded, which prevents legitimate clients from being able to access the system. The 
depletion attack is hard to control or manage compared to the bandwidth attack. 
In order to launch DoS attacks, attackers need to set up attack network connection 
systems with compromised systems. To set up an attack network, DoS attackers use 
scanning tools to search unprotected computer systems or hosts on the Internet. Alomari 
et al. (2012), Yu (2014), and Stewart et al. (2015) explained how DoS attackers set up 
botnets (robot networks) to coordinate launching from botnets in compromised systems. 
The attacker launches bots, which are small scripts for performing automated functions to 
secondary targets that send other entities to the primary target. Before organizing a 
botnet, attackers access the potential targets using the Internet and run scripts to get into 
the compromised systems. The attackers then install harmful software to the target’s 
computer using a virus, worm, attachments, and other methods. After installing the 
harmful software into compromised systems, the attacker uses the weakness of various 
layers of the network (i.e., SYN, UDP, and ICMP flooding) to make the system a 
secondary victim and use it as a robot in accessing the primary targets. The command and 
control server act as the headquarters of a botnet by communicating with the bots to 
update the attack order and tools. The control servers are set by the programmers to have 
intermediate nodes between them and the bots to maintain them. The messages in the 
communication of the control server and the bots are encrypted to encroach on the 
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network bandwidth and resources of the target, hence facilitating denial of legitimate 
access by clients to the servers hence no service. 
A large volume of botnets will shut down the targeted systems. To make sure that 
all bots get into contact with their various call command and control servers, the relevant 
IP addresses of the central command centers must keep changing to prevent trace and 
detection for elimination. To remain undetected, attackers separate botnet activities to 
prevent them from being removed or detected. Techniques such as reflectors, IP tricking, 
code confusion, and memeory coding are used by attackers to make sure their bots 
survive. The masters or owners of botnets avoid detection and elimination by changing 
servers and IP of command and control while still maintaining the communication 
between the bots and the command and control servers (Yu, 2014).  
Commonly Used Attack Tools 
 Attackers use common tools to perform DoS attacks. Radware (2013) provided 
information about attack tools used by attackers. Attackers use some of these tools to 
launch application layer, volume-based, and protocol DoS attacks.  
Trinoo 
Tripathi, Gupta, Almomani, Mishra, and Veluru (2013) referred to several 
resources that described how attackers use Trinoo to accomplish flooding attacks against 
a combination of several IP addresses. Trinoo commands the master and agent computers 
to send DoS flooding (see Figure 1). In such a scenario, DoS attackers use sizeable UDP 
packets to manipulate some ports on victims’ computers, and attackers are able to access 
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information by using application vulnerabilities on the victims’ computers (Radware, 
2013).  
Tribe Flood Network Tool 
Behal and Kumar (2017) described the Tribe Flood Network (TFN) tool, which 
consists of a combination of computer programs that attackers use to execute smurf 
attacks, UDP floods, and ICMP floods. This set of computer programs uses master–slave 
architecture to manipulate random ports at the victims’ computers. To execute a TFN 
attack, the TFN master station sends a command package to several TFN servers. On 
command, the sent signals generate a predefined DoS attack against the target systems 
(see Figure 1). Attackers can both randomize the source ports and hide the source IP 
address to make the DoS attack more widespread. To avoid detection, attackers vary the 
sizes of packets by using packet crafting tools like Loki to communicate to the master 
servers. The ICMP echo reply packets play a role in controlling TFN agents from a 
remote location.  
 
Figure 1. Master slave botnet attacks. 
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Somal and Virk (2014) indicated that the TFN 2000 has various techniques for 
overflowing in conjunction with other exploits to carry out DoS attacks. Hoque, Bhuyan, 
Baishya, Bhattacharyya, and Kalita (2014) described how the tool could operate in 
distributed mode by connecting various computer systems to the Internet for an attack on 
a single computer system. Due to its distributed mode of operation, the tool comprises 
two modules including a server and a client module. The user of the program must supply 
a password to initiate and terminate a TFN 2000 attack. Communication between the 
servers and the clients involves using ICMP echo reply packets. As a result, network 
users find it hard to detect the attack due to the absence of port numbers.  
Stacheldraht Tool 
In addition to the TFN tool, Behal and Kumar (2017) examined the Stacheldraht 
tool. Stacheldraht consists of a set of computer programs initially designed by Solaris and 
Lixus. This set of programs plays the role of a DoS agent. The DoS agent combines some 
elements of Trinoo with TFN. Stacheldraht can add some encryption between the 
attackers and the master. The tool can also add updates of the agent code to enhance the 
efficiency of attacks on the victim’s computer systems. This tool enables source address 
IP spoofing and renewals (Radware, 2013). Stacheldraht executes several DoS attacks, 
including smurf attacks, UDP floods, TCP SYN floods, and ICMP floods. Stacheldraht 
can also use TCP to communicate between the master systems and the agents.  
Shaft 
Another advanced tool for DoS attack is Shaft. Shaft belongs in the same category 
as Trinoo and Stacheldraht. Behal and Kumar (2017) noted that the Shaft tool brings back 
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statistical information from agent to handler. Its DoS attack involves collecting statistical 
information from the victim machine (Radware, 2013). The tool has some additional 
elements, such as the capability to turn on master servers and master ports on the fly. 
Shaft consists of one or more shaft masters and several sets of shaft agents. The attacker 
uses the client to interact with the handlers. To achieve communication between handlers 
and agents, the attacker uses the unreliable IP protocol UDP. Switching master servers 
and master ports disrupts detection. Tenet connections from the attacker to the master 
provide better conditions for remote control. Attackers can incorporate passwords and 
tickets in the command codes to the agents (Dietrich, Long, & Dittrich, 2000). 
Mstream 
According to Hoque et al. (2014), Mstream acts as a classic point-to-point DoS 
attack tool. This program can affect users connected to a network with several agents. 
Attackers can use a password-protected interactive login to control the master servers 
remotely. Attackers can conceal their identity by setting up the program on both handler 
and agent systems. The Mstream tool also spoofs the source IP addresses and randomizes 
the client ports. The communication process occurs in TCP and UDP packets, which 
makes it hard to encrypt. 
Trinity 
Behal and Kumar (2017), Mohiuddin, Uddin, and Someswar (2014) described 
Trinity as a more sophisticated DoS tool for flooding attacks (UDP, TCP, IP fragment 
used to initiate a massive IP flood against several victims’ computer systems). Trinity 
operates the same way as other DoS tools, such as TFN and Trinoo. Alomari et al. (2012) 
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claimed that Trinity has become one of the advanced Internet relay chat (IRC)-based DoS 
tools. Attackers can secretly control the hacked servers from a remote location with the 
help of the IRC channel. The chat feature hides the identity of the attacker and makes the 
attacker’s operations undetected. 
Attackers 
Although the term hacker refers to all individuals and groups engaged in cyber-
attacks with malicious code that target companies, categorizing all cyber-security 
attackers into a single group creates conceptual problems. Several investigators noted that 
hackers are not a homogeneous class (Harris & Maymi, 2016; Prasad, 2014). Calling a 
cyber-attacker a hacker can lead to confusion, vagueness, and misconceptions. Early in 
the conceptualization of cyber-attackers, Rogers (2001) noted that researchers should 
name groups of attackers for research to take place. Harris and Maymi (2016) claimed 
that subgroups of hackers join groups depending on what they want to achieve in their 
hacking attempts. Different types of attackers, including script kiddies, crackers, and 
hackers, can assault and target the values of companies. All three types of attackers are 
skillful in system identification, and engaging in such activities is illegal, as they obtain 
access to systems without the owners’ knowledge (Harris & Maymi, 2016). Different 
groups of attackers might also end up attacking a single cyber-site or system at the same 
time but for different reasons.  
Script Kiddies 
In examining the script kiddies or attackers who focus on cyber-intrusions without 
destroying data or gaining system knowledge, Harris and Maymi (2016) explained that 
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this group is unsophisticated and unskillful in hacking, as they do not follow the normal 
guidelines for cyber-security attack activity. Professional hacking entails having 
knowledge, being skillful, and having the mindset of learning more about the system 
while pursuing the act of attacking. However, script kiddies are impatient in their use of 
malicious code. Their actions are quick, and they take many shortcuts, which results in 
superficial hacking. Conrad et al. (2015) claimed that script kiddies use the hacking 
guidelines established by professional hackers to launch their cyber-attacks; they do not 
establish their own. As much as script kiddies lack experience and are unknowledgeable, 
the damage they cause to a computer system is just as serious as the damage caused by 
other attackers. Rittinghouse and Hancock (2003) noted this group’s tendency to use 
programs written by professional hackers to do their work. Script kiddies copy and paste 
codes used by others to gain access to systems (Lemos, 2000). Members of this group do 
not have their own ideas about breaching companies’ security systems. They engage in 
cyber-attacks to show that they can do it successfully.  
Crackers 
Crackers are cyber-security attackers who target companies with DoS and 
malware. The attackers in this group obtain access to a company’s computer system 
illegally with the motive to destroy, steal from, and introduce viruses into the system. 
Crackers target credit cards, files, and the computer systems to corrupt them (Harris & 
Maymi, 2016). People confused the terms cracker and hacker, as both groups of attackers 
use some of the same skills to access a computer system and cause destruction (Conrad et 
al., 2015). Raymond (1996) supported the idea of applying the term cracker to everyone 
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who engages in computer attacks illegally. In referring to the computer breaching 
criminal activity of crackers, Clifford (2011) noted that crackers only gain access to a 
system to cause malicious destruction of the system.  
Hackers 
Hackers use various methods to block cyber-security systems with DoS. 
According to Moore (2015), the terms script kiddies and crackers made it more 
complicated to understand the term hacker. The term hacker has lost a lot of its original 
meaning, which used to refer to someone knowledgeable about computer efficiency, 
creativity, and compact computer programming (Levy, 1984). Schell and Melnychuk 
(2011) noted that this positive meaning has been diluted because the hackers under the 
first definition enjoyed cognitive challenges. An association used to exist between 
hackers and the satisfaction they derived from exploring and overcoming intellectual 
barriers. Hackers need to show their skills as they go about gaining illegal access to 
computer systems. Harris and Maymi (2016) also tried to clarify this term and discovered 
that it fits into two categories of expert programmers: the black hats or illegal hackers and 
the white hats, or those associated with attacking a computer system in a planned manner.  
Researchers in the field of cultural studies described the category of hackers. 
According to Wark (2004), early hackers created a class that was similar to the 
capitalists’ class. The relevance of class analysis has withstood the test of dispute posited 
by Fuchs (2010), where most of the world’s population depends on some type of wage 
earning activity to survive. Conversely, by examining the hacker culture, Coleman (2013) 
noted that hackers felt motivated by several driving forces. Most of their motives reflect a 
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commitment to “productive freedom” (p. 3) or to libertarian ideas. Kelty (2008) noted 
hackers’ ability to overturn preexisting concepts and established modes of representation. 
Hackers use various methods to flood the target network with information and breach 
security systems. To accomplish that feat, hackers commonly use clocking software to 
control logs, logger files, and stamps.  
Script kiddies, crackers, and hackers are all cyber-security attackers who use 
malicious code, and they attack the same network or computer systems. To avoid 
confusion, just as Stewart et al. (2011) did, the researcher used the term attackers in this 
study to refer to the following three existing categories: script kiddies, crackers, and 
hackers. Members of these subgroups all use the same means to illegally block 
communication, gain access to a system, and preserve their access.  
Attacking Process 
Business sector attackers use techniques to reach their targets to perform DoS 
attacks. Harris and Maymi (2016) and Conrad et al. (2015) portrayed cyber-security 
attack phases to reach company values in various ways. Skoudis and Zeltser (2006) also 
categorized attack techniques. The stages of the cyber-security attacks with DoS often 
involve reconnaissance, scanning, and enumeration, in which the attackers try to seek as 
much information about the target’s system as possible. They search for this information 
using web browsers, employing tools to send packets to spot hosts, and detecting services 
run on the target computer of the company. The attackers’ next step is to gain access to 




The initial phase of cyber-security attacking is reconnaissance. In an analogy to a 
traditional criminal attack, this stage is similar to walking into a crime site through the 
DNS tables and using nlookup to conduct domain zone transfers (Sanghvi & Dahiya, 
2013). Liu and Cheng (2009) described manipulations of the host system’s domain to 
gain Internet-accessible names. Disguised as common users, attackers search for domain 
names to look for information concerning the target network. These reconnaissance 
techniques provide preliminary information about the target structure to break into the 
system infrastructure. Reconnaissance includes intent reaching, social engineering, 
location mapping of systems, dumpster diving, domain name management, querying who 
is, and eavesdropping.  
Researchers often described DoS attacks against companies using analogies 
similar to traditional crime methods (Sanghvi & Dahiya, 2013) because the attack 
procedure follows an organized process. Wiles, Gudaitis, Jabbusch, Rogers, and Lowther 
(2012) explained how advanced attackers have become in their approach, using 
sophisticated but unexpected methods to obtain access to victims’ information systems. 
Sanghvi and Dahiya (2013) noted that active reconnaissance and passive reconnaissance 
are common in modern methods of attack. In active reconnaissance, the idea is to target 
the IP address, packet route, and ports using different technologies, including ping, trace 
route, and netcat. In contrast, the aim of passive reconnaissance is to intrude systems 
without the victim noticing the entry due to minimal correspondence with the target. The 
intention of passive reconnaissance is to avoid all forms of observation or traces of print, 
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and another term for the method is footprinting (Harris & Maymi, 2016). In the process 
of reconnaissance, attackers also try to gain general information about the organization in 
question. Attackers access the companies’ profile for scanning the target security. 
Attackers use accumulated data for targeting an organization’s security to reveal system 
vulnerability.  
Scanning 
After reconnaissance phases, attackers can use automated apparatuses to scan 
nodes and find open and active ports of the target. The scanning phase is a logical 
expansion of the active reconnaissance. By scanning, attackers can determine which 
services are operating on the chosen node. During this process, attackers can find targeted 
organizational firewalls, intrusion detections systems, routing, and networking typology. 
The scanning phase also includes war driving, ping sweeps, and war dialing to discover 
the system connections (Stewart, 2011). 
Attackers developed remote attacks using DoS to target businesses. Harris and 
Maymi (2016) described remote hacking tools and the techniques that attackers use. As 
knowledge of the port used by a target is important in the success rate of an attack on a 
system, attackers employ strategies to scan targets’ ports. Using these strategies, it 
becomes possible to connect to the target’s system or port, such as port 21 (FTP) or port 
80 (HTTP). Port scanning and operating system fingerprinting are two means of gaining 
access to victims’ systems. Attackers used these techniques to overcome various forms of 
defenses. Sanghvi and Dahiya (2013) described some of the most common system tools 
(ie., Snort, Nmap, and TCP Dump) that attackers can use to collect data and make port 
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detections. Stewart et al. (2015) focused on Nmap scanning tools that are used to detect 
the existing state of each network port and IP protocols, as well as tools that make use of 
timing options, remote operating system detection, port filtering, and parallel scanning. 
By scanning ports, attackers gain access to aspects of the targeted system exposed to 
attack, and they identify those that they cannot attack. Researchers have not examined 
several new tools, including Wireshark, and attackers are developing new tools that 
create challenges for cyber-defense.  
Wireshark is a software tool that can read the organization of various networking 
protocols. Security professionals used Wireshark for defensive mechanisms such as an 
IDS (Banerjee, Vashishtha, & Saxena, 2010). Others used it to seize the packets 
(TCP/UDP) from networks, whether wired or wireless. Wireshark acts as a wire sniffer 
and penetrates the operational scopes of various network protocols. Wireshark is able to 
access TCP streams of the network on which the system operates. It is a sniffer because it 
can read all the operational movements of a browser and determine all the processes 
taking place on the browser, which includes all forms of clear-text passwords that the 
browser may have. Orebaugh, Burke, Perce, Wright, and Morris (2007) noted that 
Wireshark’s power stems from its ability to overpower data packets found on the network 
interface in which it operates.  
Enumeration 
Enumeration is the process of collecting information about targeted companies’ 
systems by linking to the systems and managing queries. The enumeration phase includes 
performing tests to discover weaknesses and to create holes in a system. Once the link 
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has been established, the victim system could send notice of connection proof. The 
confirmation banner can comprise information about product name and version number 
of the facility. From a security service, hackers can obtain valuable data. In this phase, 
attackers identify operating systems and applications to mine information. Attackers can 
extract information about service from the systems, user names, computer systems, and 
network resources. Attackers make a link with targeted systems to execute command 
queries. The information provides possible attack steps. In the enumeration phase, several 
attack programs exist that allow unauthorized access (Harris & Maymi, 2016). Attackers 
enumerate the following: network sources, user names and groups, applications and 
banners, IP table, routing tables, simple network management protocol (SNMP), and 
DNS details. Enumeration is the process of uncovering vulnerabilities of targeted 
business sectors to perform successful attacks.  
Attacking 
Groundwork gives the attackers information on how to successfully attack the 
systems. If attackers successfully breach the systems, this process is ephemeral. If they do 
not successfully breach the systems, attackers modify the exploit, adjust payload, retune 
the vector, and relaunch system attack. Attackers perform virus attacks, password 
cracking, and other unauthorized processes on target systems to ensure systems function 
and respond in a manner that suits the attacker rather than the host (Harris & Maymi, 
2016).  
In an attacking phase, attackers can install malicious software to launch DoS 
attack. Conrad et al. (2015) and Harris and Maymi (2016) mentioned that after attackers 
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gain entry into a system through hacking, they can introduce all forms of malicious 
software to gain total control over the system. Attackers can gain access to files and 
programs on the system and try to use these in such a way that there is no trace of their 
activity. Attackers can also replace programs running on the host system with harmful 
applications, commonly Trojan horses and other malicious software. Although the IDSs 
frequently sense the modified system file, experienced attackers generally escape 
detection by concealing traces of their presence (Stewart, 2011). 
DoS attackers achieve their success by using several attackers and controlled or 
breached computer systems as the basis to attack Internet traffic. DoS attacks make the 
business services unreachable for the service to be delivered.  
Cyber-Security  
DoS are agents that attackers use to attack business cyber-security systems. To 
understand the extant writing on cyber-security and DoS attacks, it is important to 
understand cyber-security in the field of cyber-security attacks. Despite the near 
ubiquitous use of the term cyber-security, there is no agreement on a precise conceptual 
understanding of the term. According to the Cyber Security Enhancement Act (2005), 
cyber-security is “the prevention of damage to, the protection of, and the restoration of 
computers, electronic communications systems, electronic communication services, wire 
communication, and electronic communication, including information contained therein, 
to ensure its availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation” (p. 
3). The focus of this approach is on the protection, prevention, and restoration of a 
company’s values. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST, 2011) 
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described cyber-security as the skill to secure or guard the operation of Internet 
communication from attacks. Sheldon and McDonald (2012) viewed cyber-security as an 
appropriately installed software system that neutralizes cyber-security attacks with DoS 
or malware and employs secure measures to safeguard confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability. An advanced cyber-security software system or a defense tool is a technique 
that can be used to secure information and network systems from attackers using DoS. 
Cyber-security involves taking action to protect and safeguard a computer system against 
attacks. 
A lack of consensus around the conceptual understanding of cyber-security could 
cause confusion. That confusion often leads to different cyber-security approaches and 
prevents nations from using common strategies to protect information systems. Despite 
this ambiguity, cyber-security is a body of different processes, practices, and technologies 
created to protect organizational computers, data, networks, and personal databases from 
DoS or malicious attackers. The function of cyber-security is to guarantee the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data (Harris & Maymi, 2016) and to provide 
protection to computer-related components and software so that unauthorized personnel 
do not have access to stored data (Stewart et al., 2015).  
Current State of Guardianship  
Defensive or guardian systems used by businesses to prevent DoS attacks 
generally fall into three categories: firewalls, IDS, and antimalware programs.  
Firewalls. A firewall is network protection mechanism that verifies the traffic 
going into and out of a network. It is a part of network security because of the functions 
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that it performs in a given network (Conrad et al., 2015). According to Harris and Maymi 
(2016), firewalls come in either software or hardware forms, and they are suitable for 
analyzing the data packets flowing into and out of networks. A firewall creates a 
permission forum that only allows approved programs to pass through the network. 
Harris and Maymi described the nature and functions of firewalls used to create secure 
and trusted networks. 
The dynamic nature by which traffic-related network attacks take place makes it 
necessary for firewalls to have variable functionality. Depending upon the nature of the 
attack, a firewall may need to operate in different formats. Harris and Maymi (2016) 
described various types of firewalls. The first carries out filtering at the IP packet level, 
ensuring that attackers do not hack the IP address of the network under surveillance in the 
first place. A second type of firewall filter is at the TCP session level, and it ensures that 
even if the hacker succeeds in bypassing the IP, the TCP will be secure against further 
entry. The last kind of firewall filters are at the application level and clear all incoming 
programs to ensure the elimination of unsafe ones (Stewart et al., 2015). Even with these 
different types of firewalls, attackers continue to devise means of gaining entry. Such 
attackers send ICMP packets to overpower DoS defenses, virtual private networks, and 
web security, thereby blocking communication between a targeted system and its peers. 
Stewart et al. (2015) endorsed the need to ping vulnerable systems with ICMP Echo 
Request.  
Sanghvi and Dahiya (2013) indicated several methods for detection that can also 
act as pre-attack mechanisms to stop port scanning from succeeding. However, attackers 
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are developing means to bypass firewall policies. Some of the new versions of attacks 
include e-mail-based Trojan horse attacks and stealth scanning techniques. Attackers who 
bypass firewall and virtual private network defenses have often been able to disable 
permitted protocols. Thus, they can use port scanning techniques to gain access to 
otherwise robust and secure network systems (Harris & Maymi, 2016). Firewalls cannot 
perfectly protect systems from breaches by attackers.  
Intrusion detection systems. Unlike conventional firewall systems, which 
monitor network traffic, the aim of an IDS is to detect security penetration. Harris and 
Maymi (2016) and Kesan and Hayes (2012) considered an IDS to be an active detective 
defense tool that helps to determine whether attackers breached the system. Three 
conventional elements of IDS are a sensor that gathers traffic data, an analyzer that 
examines attempted or completed suspicious activity, and a user who forwards alerts to 
the security manager (Harris & Maymi, 2016; Kesan & Hayes, 2012). The interaction 
between the intruder malware and the IDS forms a game in which the virus tries to infect 
a system undetected while the IDS tries to alert networks to malicious activity.   
Harris and Maymi (2016) and Conrad et al. (2015) described different types of 
IDSs. Network-based IDSs are software or hardware that monitor network traffic and 
examine packet payloads before they go to the target. Host-based IDS (HIDS) tools are 
installed on servers to detect malicious action, scrutinize systems data, and monitor 
changes. HIDS are used to identify abnormalities on the host systems that network-based 
IDS cannot detect. Rule-based IDSs are used to detect attack activities. Statistical IDSs 
are used for anomaly detection mode and to establish a learning manner to make a profile 
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of normal activity. These IDSs identify unusual activities, inspect trial files, and identify 
suspicious attempts by employing a blend of pattern matching and guidelines. A 
signature-based IDS compares data in packet headers to known attacks stored in a 
database. Signature IDSs have two weaknesses: comparing the large flow of traffic with 
every signature in the database and detecting new forms of attacks.  
An IDS is a sophisticated auditing log and traffic monitoring tool that reveals 
many malicious actions. However, an IDS does not represent total protection of the 
system of a company from DoS attacks. Malware developers intensify their efforts to 
infect computer systems as a part of the game between the malware and the IDS.  
Intrusion prevention systems. Intrusion detection systems have become 
powerful and sophisticated and often incorporate prevention mechanisms that changed 
cyber-security for businesses. Like Trost (2010), Harris and Maymi (2016) examined 
how IDS’s and intrusion prevention systems (IPS) work in intrusion analysis. IPS can use 
these systems for attack analysis, damage mitigation, and attacker tracking. Much of the 
work done by Trost involves techniques and business drivers of intrusion detection and 
prevention and an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses associated with 
mainstream monitoring tools. The use of IPS technologies and attack graphs for mapping 
the path of network vulnerability serves as a means of achieving the proactive prevention 
of intrusion. According to Harris and Maymi, IPS is an extension of IDS and detects both 
traffic and activities. IPS’s hinder detected invasions. Despite this breakthrough in new 
defense tools, no device prevents all DoS attacks; the game is ongoing.  
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Antimalware. Antimalware is the general term for programs that users employ to 
prevent, detect, and eliminate hazardous programs such as DoS malware bots or botnet, 
viruses, and worms (Harris & Maymi, 2016). Harris and Maymi (2016) also provided 
methods for defending against each type of attack. A botnet is a kind of malware that 
installs itself on many computers through infected e-mails, Trojan horses, and shared 
media. This type of virus uses to perform DoS attacks. 
 To identify various types of antimalware, signature detection is one of the most 
effective techniques (Harris & Maymi, 2016; Silnov, 2013). This technique evaluates the 
contents of the files stored in databases against identified malware signatures or code 
sequences. Antivirus software examines e-mails and files, compares them with the 
signatures, and stores them in the system’s database. When they match, the antivirus 
software detects the viruses within the files. Although Silnov (2013) and Harris and 
Maymi (2016) agreed that this technique is effective; they also observed that it responds 
slowly to new attacks. To protect companies from DoS botnet malware attacks and 
overcome this weakness in the signature detection technique, information security 
practitioners and researchers introduced heuristic techniques (Harris & Maymi, 2016). 
Security professionals use heuristic techniques to scrutinize the structure of malware 
code, evaluate the instructions of the code, and assess the probability of malevolence. 
Heuristic techniques exhibit high performance, although they often have a high rate of 
false positives that result in flagging files that contain no malware. Although the false 
positive rate is high, heuristic software may have difficulty detecting newly developed 
malicious code (Kaspersky, 2013). 
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According to Harris and Maymi (2016), in contrast to the signature-based or 
heuristic scanning technique, behavior blocking software integrates itself into the 
operating system of the main (host) system and examines the entire system to prevent 
malicious activities. The system monitors and screens the interaction and compatibility of 
the malicious code with the system’s operating system. When the behavior blocking 
software finds that the malicious code is about to affect the integrity of the system, it 
blocks and restricts the actions of the harmful codes. Continuous monitoring requires 
high levels of proficiency, as well as organizational and system resources. 
Signature-based is not effective for safeguarding a company’s systems with 
regard to identifying new malware. This performance is also a weakness of behavior 
blocking antimalware. Amro and Alkhalifah (2015) questioned why viruses spread and 
bypass antivirus defense software without detection. Attackers use more system-
adaptable malicious code, and cyber-security breaches have become more complex and 
harder to detect. Antimalware installations scan and detect malware at networking access 
points but were ineffective for more complex malware designed to avoid this sort of 
detection (Harris & Maymi, 2016). Despite firewalls, IDSs, and antimalware, attackers 
attack organizational cyber-security systems successfully.  
Guardianship Actions 
Cyber-security defense involves a variety of different measures based on the type 
of attack. Several cyber-security defenders used a countermeasures model to protect their 
infrastructures from DoS attacks. The focus of defenses is on risk reduction through 
increasing effective cyber-security systems. There is often one corresponding 
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countermeasure for every available attack (Harris & Maymi, 2016). Countermeasures 
operate by detecting, preventing, and mitigating threats (Harris & Maymi, 2016); 
countermeasure should be able to cope with new technological innovation.  
Passive versus active defense. Cyber-security systems use both passive and 
active techniques to counteract DoS attacks. These systems have several inadequacies 
with regard to protecting information. Kesan and Hayes (2012) studied passive systems 
in comparison to the level of threat that comes from modern cyber-security attackers 
found deficiencies in defensive capabilities versus cyber-attack capabilities. Active 
defenses are suitable because users can trace and actively respond to threats posed by an 
attack, in addition to targeting the attack itself. Kesan and Hayes noted that defense 
generally involves interrupting a pending attack and active defenses work via a mitigation 
process. The mechanism by which active defense operates on attacks is active threat 
neutralization, which includes offensive actions that neutralize threats but do not 
necessarily retaliate against the threats or attacks. Although this may sound convincing in 
terms of improving cyber-security, further research is necessary to verify the confidence 
levels of the trace-backs performed by the active defense to ensure their accuracy.  
Detection. Detection is the most important measure in the incident reaction. In 
Conrad et al. (2015)’s assumptions, cyber-security experts use the detection phase to 
decide whether an event has occurred. This process involves identifying any security 
breaches that take place within a system as used in information security systems. When 
prevention fails in security systems, detection can fill the gap. According to Straub and 
Nance (1990), finding computer misuse involves three methods: unintentional finding, 
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finding in the course of internal system managements, and finding focused on revealing 
actions. Hoffer and Straub (1989) pointed out that most company security professionals 
do not carry out this form of detection. Consequently, the discovery of most cyber-attacks 
with malware is accidental or through normal system control. 
Prevention. As a security measure, prevention refers to a means of not 
experiencing an attack with DoS. Prevention has several forms, including using guards, 
authentication devices, identifying traffic patterns, and firewalls (Harris & Maymi, 2016). 
Prevention ensures threats do not surface at all. Harris and Maymi (2016) and Conrad et 
al. (2015) stressed that prevention is a commonly used cyber-security system. Preventive 
efforts can be effective for cyber-security.  
Problems for Guardianship  
Attempts to have an all-in-one security solution to protect against Internet-based 
DoS attacks include several additional factors, including the nature of different 
institutions; diverse security needs across companies and departments; and the number of 
different applications commonly used by businesses, including e-mail, electronic 
commerce, and databases (Andress, 2011). The various current applications and systems 
posed a challenge for system administrators to secure the confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability of all services. Overarching security solutions make it difficult to protect 
companies’ information systems in multiple application systems. When diverse computer 
systems lack a common approach to cyber-security, it becomes difficult to create a 
corresponding, all-in-one security solution (Harris & Maymi, 2016). 
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The diversity of computer platforms, operating systems, and architectures has 
inspired an equally diverse array of tactics, schemes, and strategies for disabling or 
compromising them from remote areas of the world (Stewart et al., 2015). Complicated 
types of cyber-attacks with DoS occurred at various levels and regions of the world 
against every kind of computer system in existence (Amoroso, 2011). In information 
systems with many diverse components, DoS attackers can block networks, inhibit access 
for businesses, and lurk in the system (Conrad et al., 2015).  
Targeted Attacks 
Targeted attacks pose several threats to the financial sector, as they jeopardize 
network accessibility, performance, and discretion. The attacks can also destroy the 
communication infrastructure through service sabotage and breaching of systems. 
Targeted attacks cause damage to their victims because of the care that attackers take in 
planning and execution (Adomi, 2011). Attackers launch attacks to break down the 
network’s infrastructure to grant intruders easy and prolonged access to enhance data 
theft. The threat posed by targeted attacks is large (Villeneuve, 2011). According to 
Chapple and Seidl (2015), opportunistic attacks are less lethal than targeted attacks 
because the latter entails infiltrating a particular target with the primary intent to malign a 
firm’s targeted business.  
DoS attacks can target any business that uses a Website. According to the Trend 
Micro (2015) study, the following traits qualify an attack as being targeted: (a) foremost, 
the culprits bear in mind a particular potential victim, perform their background checks 
on the target and invest a substantial amount of energy towards developing the attack and 
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executing it; (b) a great volume of DoS attacks are ensured by the creation of botnets by 
the attack; and (c) the culprits spend a substantial amount of energy in actualizing the 
attack and carrying it out over and over again. A focused attack is, therefore, one where a 
particular company is targeted. Seeing as the actions and moves made by the attackers in 
a targeted attack are tweaked to accomplish the mission in particular, they are more 
harmful and cause more damage. Targeted attacks entail meticulous layout of strategy; 
they take place as soon as the attacker chooses; they focus on a particular target in order 
that they can attain their desired goal; and the attackers are able to knock the victims off 
using DoS as opposed to illegally acquiring information. 
One of the largest forms of cyber-threats is the targeted attack, as was revealed in 
Trend Micro (2015) research in the contemporary Internet-linked world. All websites, 
online business servers or networks are prone to DoS attacks with a loss of reputation and 
monetary standing being considered the worst that a targeted corporation stands to lose. 
Some of the main reasons why targeted attacks are launched include control maintenance, 
unwarranted usage of systems, target infections, and collection of intelligence. According 
to Sood and Enbody (2014), when launched, a targeted attack is classified as one that is 
after a particular entity, be it a user, an organization or a company, in order that it can 
either gain access to its crucial assets or corrupt its networks. 
O’Leary et al. (2017) argued that a targeted attack had to have a scope, an element 
of persistence, and effort, similar in terms of the nature of the targeted attacks and their 
characteristics. Scope, persistence, and level of effort were defined as follows: (a) scope: 
the attackers narrow down to a specific entity; (b) persistence: effort is made to 
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coordinate the activities being carried out in order that particular aims are realized as 
opposed to rushing the attack with the aim of bypassing the security threats in place; and 
(c) level of effort: A substantial amount of time, effort, and resources are applied in order 
to enact the attack. By stating characteristics of targeted attacks as being intentional, 
having a directive, and being tenacious, O’Leary et al. showed the importance of 
stratifying the different types of attacks according to whether they are targeted or not. 
There are high chances that an attack is targeted if it is identified as being aimed at a 
particular target or an assortment of targets with similar characteristics (for example 
companies in a common sector), leading to a conclusion that attacks that are targeted, to 
some extent, have an inclination toward monetary gain. Application of various styles and 
technology may be evident, and the attacker could apply different means as necessary to 
accomplish their mission.  
Bendovschi, Al-Nemrat, and Ionescu (2016) gathered and studied numerical data 
of cyber-attacks collected by Verizon, a prominent company in the international security 
sector. The data included information about 4,785 attacks and the targets, the culprit, the 
weaknesses that made it possible for the ambush to occur, the consequence of the attack, 
and the approximate incurred damages. Their study led to a conclusion drawn by the 
National Cyber Security Center (2016) that attacks that were not targeted did not pose as 
critical a threat as those that were targeted, simply because by targeting, the attack is 
customized to inflict more damage as opposed to a stray attack. Unleashing of botnets is 
an example of an attack that is targeted. 
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With reference to the description of targeted attacks, several researchers 
(Bendovschi, 2015; Bendovschi et al., 2016; Whalen, 2017; Wueest, 2014) examined the 
relationship between business sectors and DoS attacks. However, this body of work does 
not give attention to, or include in their studies, the relationship between the rate of 
attacks and business sector or generated revenues and assets. Indeed, differences among 
business sectors in attack rates, duration of attacks, and financial damages resulting from 
attacks has not been examined in previous studies. Nor did they examine the relationships 
between company assets and revenues and the duration of attacks as well as the financial 
damages resulting from attacks. The criteria of targeted attacks (O'Leary et al., 2017; 
Trend Micro, 2015) can be considered relevant and significant to this study: having a 
specific target in mind, creating botnets to increase volume of DoS attacks, and focusing 
on specific organizations within an industry. 
Motivation 
The most apparent result of DoS attacks is unavailability of the service to the 
authentic customers; however, the objectives of the culprits are rarely clear and may vary 
significantly. Nonetheless, according to the lion’s share of researchers, while causing 
damage to the victim is among the aims of DoS attacks, as is affluence within the hacker 
community, the main agenda is barricading the present resources, or performance 
degradation of the service needed by the machine that is targeted, to achieve material 
gain.  
Sood and Enbody (2014) suggested that targeted attacks aim at corrupting 
business proceedings and are not solely for industrial espionage and monetary gain. 
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However, Semantic’s (2015) indicated that the bulk of focused attacks in the financial 
sector are highly probable to be geared towards financial gain by the attackers. This 
research grouped attack motivation into three categories: financial motivation, espionage 
motivation, and political motivation. Exposure of banks to ‘mass market’ attacks was just 
as frequent as with other organizations making them, as well as other financial sectors, 
more susceptible to targeted attacks spanning IT security domains.  
Regarding the motivation of DoS attacks Amoroso (2013), indicated that the need 
to demonstrate their prowess and achieve financial gains motivates attackers. In other 
words, hackers are motivated by the desire for fame and recognition. Supporting these 
findings, Prasad, Reddy, and Rao (2014) noted that financial gain, reputation, 
philosophical belief, and retaliation are the key drivers. Further, Madarie (2017) noticed 
that attackers want to demonstrate their ability to overcome hurdles using creativity and 
innovative computer skills. Sociocultural and political gain are two motivations that are 
beyond the scope of this study. Security experts found several reasons for cyber-
intrusions, including theft of data and money, disruption of network functioning, 
blackmail, and economic sabotage (Lawrence et al., 2017). Regardless of the driving 
force behind them, new DoS attacks target companies’ networks on a regular basis. 
However, researchers have not located any common factors that influence the targeting of 
companies and their holdings. 
For many researchers, the leading indicators for attacks remain perplexing, 
particularly because the main aims of DoS attacks often remain unknown, despite the 
attacker’s claims of responsibility (Shakarian et al., 2013). For example, according to The 
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Economist (2014), the motivation for targeting the financial sector remains unknown. 
Several theories emerged to explain the attacks, including hackers employed by nation 
states to retaliate against laws or to acquire critical data. Some network hacking could be 
the result of foreign countries colluding with individuals to obtain financial information. 
Notably, theft of data for monetary gains has emerged as a driving factor behind network 
attacks. Various business sectors were victims of financially targeted attacks. 
Looking at attacks in the context of targeting company assets and other holdings 
produces a more useful picture. Van Beveren and Falkinder (2005) explained that 
malware often exists to make a financial profit or otherwise exploit lucrative situations. 
Harris and Maymi (2016) noted the financial motive as well, but they also indicated that 
attackers use DoS to inflict chaos, which can range from being beneficial to the hackers 
to being destructive. Hackers target a range of assets, from individual users to 
government institutions and multinational corporations.  
The frequency of cyber-attacks with DoS varies between different sectors and 
companies within each sector. This variation could be due to differences in asset and 
revenue values. One of the limitations of previous studies is that they were not 
longitudinal. They rested on short-term reports and case studies rather than examining a 
company’s assets and revenues over decades. Further, the scholars could not identify 
whether financial profiles, fame or reputation, or other cultural situations serve as 
motivations for DoS attacks. Researchers have not studied DoS attacks targeting 
companies based on their sector types, assets or revenues.  
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Targeted Business Sectors 
Because there are several avenues to attack company computer systems, there are 
many motivations to attack. Although the motivations behind DoS attacks against targets 
are not known, certain business sectors seem to be vulnerable. From 2009 to 2013, cyber-
infiltration in the healthcare and insurance sectors increased. McGee (2014) noted that 
healthcare-related companies are vulnerable to attackers because of the sensitive 
information on their networks. In their cyber-attack study, Sood and Enbody (2014) 
claimed that insurance firms became targets for cyber-attacks. Unauthorized intrusions 
expose medical firms to blackmail risks because patient information (i.e., identifying 
details, medical records, and financial status) may enter the public domain.  
The Identity Theft Resource Center (2014) reported that the financial, insurance, 
education, and business sectors are the most attractive for targeted cyber-attacks. Akamai 
(2015) reported the gaming industry as being the most widely attacked by DoS threats as 
compared to any other sector during the Q1 of 2015 and in the same manner, as from Q2 
of 2014.  
On the other hand, Rivalhost Managed Web Hosting (2013) identified the finance 
sector as the most targeted. Verisign (2014) reported that in the second quarter of 2014, 
media represented 43% of all targeted attacks, closely followed by IT services at 41% of 
the attacks. Verisign also reported telecommunication service, institutions of finance, and 
the public sector as targeted sectors. Akamai (2015) indicated that the gaming sector, 
software, and media were the most threatened sectors by the DoS flood attacks. Yadav 
and Gour (2014) identified web-based business (financial services, retail, travel) as the 
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main targeted sector. They also stated that no field is spared from DoS threats. Clearly, 
there is no consensus among researchers on the most commonly targeted sectors types.  
In addition to examining the most targeted business industries, researchers also 
examined the industries most threatened by DoS attacks in terms of what they stand to 
lose. On the Internet hosting provider DoS attacks, Rivalhost Managed Web Hosting’s 
(2013) study indicated that one of the highest rated victims of DoS attacks being Internet 
service providers with such attacks being complicated and set on precise websites leading 
to a spread in the network causing its impacts to be felt by different customers. As a 
result, sites that deal in Ecommerce are in a position to lose much more from such 
attacks. The researchers found that the DoS attacks continues to be a problem for 
businesses large and small. Similarly, Yadav and Gour (2014) reported that the industries 
most threatened by DoS were those dealing in web-based transactions, the likes of 
telecom services, financial services, travel, retail, and IT. Wueest (2014) identified the 
energy sector as a field with great risk as attacks would result in catastrophic disorder and 
a chain of effects whose eventuality would be monetary loss.  
Over the 3 years of Bendovschi’s (2015) study of patterns and trends in 
cybercrime, a compelling relationship was established between the kinds of industries in 
question and the kinds of threats experienced, which led to the conclusion that cyber-
crime was a menace to all types of business regardless of the public domain being the 
most sought-after target. Specifically, Bendovschi showed that most sectors are targeted 
with DoS attacks and identified DoS as being the threat most frequent type of attack from 
the array of the many in existence. Cyber-attacks became a threat to all sector scales 
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(private companies, Internet and online services, retail education, online services, 
finance, not-for-profit organizations). Those conducting the attacks are primarily 
targeting information that could be of value. Their aim is to gain access to information 
with the capability of earning either them or the associated sponsors great benefits. 
Through the process of reviewing Verizon’s data, Bendovschi et al. (2016) revealed that 
they could identify relationships between the attacks carried out.  
Financial Damages 
 On the consequence of financial damage with DoS attacks, Anderson et al. (2013) 
classified damage or loss into direct and indirect damages. The line of reasoning was the 
direct loses comprise of infrastructural downtime, loss of online traffic, paid ransom and 
customer compensation among others while indirect damage is when the reputation or the 
stock price is damaged. An unavailability of networking access for users can result in 
financial loss for targeted business sectors. In addition to financial loss, the consequences 
of DoS attacks can embrace brand and reputation damage, loss if investor confidence, 
and violation of service agreement.   
Though attacks that deny computer access result in financial loss in the business 
sector, Pau (2013) asserted that there is minimal body of evidence on assessment of 
damage. According to his study, companies are unable to approximate the kind of loss 
they incur when their systems are infiltrated whether successfully or unsuccessfully. He 
thus proposed that it is imperative to take into consideration the relationship of other 
targets and the bodies affected by the targeted system and its related bodies and how an 
infiltration affects the sustainability of the entire organization. Considering finance and 
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economics, a critical question is on the allocation of assets when aiming at some 
performance goals.  
Anderson et al. (2012) focused on different business organizations such as online 
retailers, business to business hubs, online marketplaces, Internet-based advertisers, 
streaming media services, and Internet commerce business. These kinds of organizations 
incur direct forms of revenue loss from any form of disruption whether the infiltration is 
successful or unsuccessful. A common feature within these organizations is that the 
mode of receiving revenue is in minutes or even seconds. Profits cannot be attained 
when there is a disruption or can be reduced in the course of a disruption (Anderson et 
al., 2013). Previous researchers did not focus on revenues and assets, but the research 
that focuses on business sector attractiveness and targets, damages, and sector types are 
valuable support to this research project. 
Business Values  
As businesses or industries are categorized according to the type of their 
economic activities, assets and revenues are fundamental elements of business sectors. 
Assets are resources with economic value that the business owns and that are recorded in 
companies’ balance sheets (Siegel, Dauber, & Shim, 2005). Assets represent the value 
of a sector or possession that can be transformed into cash. Assets can be largely 
classified into current, fixed, financial investment, and intangible assets. Current assets 
are short-term economic resources that can be changed into cash within a year period; 
Current assets include cash, accounts receivable, and other resources. Compared to 
current assets, fixed assets are long-term sources that include plant, equipment, and 
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buildings (CFI, 2018). According to Bragg (2017), fixed assets are items that generate 
economic benefits over a long period of time. However, accounting for fixed assets is not 
uniform throughout the world. Financial assets represent investments, such as banks, 
stocks, and bonds, whose values derive from contractual claim of what they represent. 
Further, intangible assets are economic resources that have no tangible presence, 
including patent, trademark, intellectual property, and copyright. Reilly and Schweihs 
(2014) stated that intangible assets’ value comes from the ability to exploit the legal 
rights related to the asset. Assets are recorded in reports, such as those compiled by 
Forbes. As an example, according to the most recent Forbes (2018) report, JPMorgan 
Chase has $2,609.8 billion assets and Amazon has $131.3 B. Prudential was the largest 
insurance business sector in the United States with assets amounting $596 billion  
(Statista, 2017). 
Revenues are the income that a business sector received from its business activity 
(Bondarenko, 2014). Most revenue comes from sales of goods or services, as such 
revenue is also referred to as sales or turnover. Revenue depends upon business activities, 
for some businesses, interest royalties or other types of fees are revenues (Carcello, 
2008). For several businesses, such as manufacturing, retail, or grocery, revenues come 
from the sale of goods. Service businesses receive most of their revenue from rendering 
services. Banks receive revenue from fees and interest generated by lending assets. In 
general, revenue is the amount of income a business sector is generating from sales of 
products or services. The more revenue a sector generates, the more money the sector 
owns. In 2016, 500 United States businesses generated $12 trillion in combined revenue. 
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In addition, the social media sector has rapidly increased its revenues by 44% in 2015 
compared to its 2014 revenues (Frohlich & Comen, 2016). 
 In relation to this study, Leukfeldt and Yar (2016) noticed that value has a 
financial character and cyber-attackers are interested in assigned value. The concept of a 
suitable target in RAT is a combination of value, and attackers are interested in assigned 
value. As such, assets and revenue might likely play a role in the risk for DoS targeted 
attacks. However, Cayubit et al. (2017) indicated that little research has endeavored to 
determine hackers’ motivations because the motives behind the acts of attacking are often 
obscure.  
Attack Targeted Metrics 
The body of literature about DoS attacks on companies’ information networks 
includes scholarship about targeting companies’ assets and other holdings (Camillo, 
2017), detecting attacks (Jasiul, Szpyrka, & Sliwa, 2014; Raj Kumar & Selvakumar, 
2011; Xuan, Shin, Thai, & Znati, 2010), protecting against security breaches (Dzurenda, 
2015; Rajesh, 2013; Ramesh, 2013), making efforts to mitigate the effects of cyber-
attacks (Patil & Kulkarni, 2011), studying system vulnerability (Harris & Maymi, 2016; 
Villeneuve, 2011), and exploring hackers’ motivations (Amoroso, 2013; Hughes & 
Cybenko, 2013). However, researchers have not addressed the metrics how and why 
attackers choose their targets. In particular, researchers have not investigated the role of 
financial metrics in determining business sectors and target candidates for cyber-attack. 
Tajalizadehkhoob et al. (2014) drew upon RAT (a motivated offender, a suitable target, 
and the absence of guardian) to describe why criminals go after a certain target and 
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examined DoS attacks through the lens of the economics of crime, but they did not 
categorize targets by assets or revenues. I attempted to address this gap by searching for a 
relationship between a business’s financial value and the duration of DoS attacks against 
it and resulting financial damages.  
The concept of metrics entails the allocation of values to objects, while the 
procedure that is employed in approximating an object’s qualities is known as a 
measurement. Often, measurement is categorized into groups: nominal, ordinal, interval, 
or ratio measurement which is the topmost form of measurement. Metrics are considered 
integral in creating security systems because of the ability to denote cause-effect 
relationships between cyber-attacks. Several cyber-security attack researchers (Behal & 
Kumar, 2017; Mateski et al., 2012; Mishra & Saini, 2013; Verendel, 2009; Savola, 2009) 
used various metrics to measure cyber-attacks, including technical, operational weakness 
volumetric attack-oriented, attacks taxonomy, business targeted types, and scale of 
security metrics-nominal, ordinal and interval. In quantitative studies on cyber security, 
Verendel (2009) grouped different kinds of literature based on the methods used for 
validation, perspective, and assumptions made regarding the quantitative security and, 
lastly, based on the targets. One rare study that developed a DoS attack metrics was 
conducted by Savola (2009), who used a holistic approach based on the fundamentals of 
security metrics. Savola’s metrics categorized goals into control areas and targeted users. 
To fill the research gaps in studies conducted by Verendel (2009) and Mishra and Saini 
(2013), this study employed a holistic perspective to categorize system-wide DoS attacks 
based on differences of rates of attacks, duration of attacks, and financial damages across 
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business sector types and to categorize the relationship of DoS attack duration and 
financial damages to assets and revenues.  
Other researchers (Tajalizadehkhoob et al., 2014) examined target selection 
attacks (attack choices) to ascertain the advancement of attacks metrics. According to 
Tajalizadehkhoob et al. (2014), security metrics can be divided based on several factors. 
Some of the factors integral in this classification are the goals for providing security, 
vulnerable areas, targeted systems, and temporal dimension. Mateski et al. (2012) 
focused on threat actions identified that the most commonly used security metrics are 
threat metrics (target no specific entity, high values entities, critical assets, specific 
single entity), taxonomy attacks, volumetric attack results, goal and business targeted 
metrics. In this study, the researcher identified whether some sectors are targeted more 
frequently than others, providing information about whether some sectors are more 
attractive than others to be targeted.  
In examining other researchers’ attack metrics, Romanosky (2016) identified that 
banks are the most vulnerable organizations when it comes to attacks though some are 
targeted more frequently compared to others. Online banks were found to be more 
vulnerable than physical banks. Data network organizations also were found to be 
vulnerable to these attacks. Attackers use DoS attacks as a strategy to attack 
organizational systems and target financial services. Trend Micro (2019) also confirmed 
the notion that banks are more likely to be DoS targets. Tajalizadehkhoob et al. (2014) 
used metrics based on RAT to determine a selection of cyber-crime targets. The model 
indicates that there are three key factors that explain why criminals chose targets: 
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motivation, suitability of a target, and the lack of proper protection. Tajalizadehkhoob et 
al. used metrics to examine the number of botnets that attacked a given domain in a one 
week. This helped in evaluating the size and attractiveness of different banks in the 
United States. However, Tajalizadehkhoob et al. faced a challenge in collecting existing 
data to examine targeted choice patterns. As a result, the current study’s variable was 
business sector types to examine DoS targeted attacks and to contribute to previous 
studies’ findings that attackers tend to favor certain financial services over others.  
Theoretical Foundation  
Modern criminology has begun perceiving the emergence of cyber-crime as new 
crime activity; scholarly research into cyber-crime increased over the last 20 years. This 
introduces a challenge to the scholars of effectively applying the knowledge, skills, and 
concepts used in a normal world setting into the cyber-attacks. To address the issues of 
cyber-crime attacks, in a breadth and depth viewpoint, identifying the relevance and 
efficacy of criminological theories that apply to DoS attacks helps to distinguish the 
association of targeted attacks and the value (assets, revenues) of businesses sector types.  
The theoretical foundation of this study was based on Cohen and Felson’s (1979) 
RAT and Cornish and Clarke’s (1987) RCT. These two theories serve as a foundation for 
cyber-security attack in literature. It is important to identify attackers’ targeted attacks 
using DoS, as well as to understand attackers’ choices regarding which companies or 
organizations to target. In this study, the researcher used RAT to explain findings 
regarding target suitability (Navarro & Jasinski, 2012); the researcher used RCT to 
consider the findings in relation to the decision-making process of attackers based on a 
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determination of rewards and to explain how DoS attacks target specific business sectors 
with particular financial values. 
The remainder of this chapter includes a review of RAT and RCT, including 
descriptions of the theories, examples of how researchers use the models, empirical 
outcomes of research using these models, the application of these theories to the research 
of cyber-attack crime, and discussion of the framework and variables that best explain 
business sector value attack with DoS.  
Routine Activity Theory (RAT) 
Application to crime. The RAT has been used in the field of criminology to 
analyze deviance and crime structures since its inception in 1979 by Cohen and Felson. 
According to Cohen and Felson (1979), the wealth of modern society provides increased 
opportunities for crime to occur, and an attack can be carried out by anyone who has the 
opportunity. They identified a natural offender as a component of the environment, 
noting that an attack must convene in the space and time of potential criminals, easy 
targets, and a lack of guardians. Cohen and Felson’s premise was that postmodernity had 
facilitated the junction in space and time of motivated offenders with potential targets. 
Their idea was that the opportunity of the crime depends on offender, target and the 
absence of guardian. The theory is an attempt to identify attacker activities and their 
patterns through elucidation of alterations in crime rate trends. According to Leukfeldt 
and Yar (2016), the concepts and applications of the RAT theory vary across research 
projects and researchers. However, key components are common to all variations: once 
an attacker is motivated, they are in a position to commit a crime at the slightest of 
81 
 
opportunities; when the target is vulnerable and too exposed, the attacker is further 
motivated to commit the crime. Therefore, the offender, the target, and the absence of a 
guardian in an enabling environment form the components of crime according to RAT.  
Application to cyber-crime. The expansion of computers caused a shift in the 
nature of traditional crime. An attacker can commit an attack from anywhere in the 
world, block access, and extract information digitally. Reyns, Henson, and Fisher (2011), 
Holt (2013), and Reyns (2016) indicated that proper timing and place, coupled with 
proper conditions (i.e., a lack of guardianship, availability of target, and motivated 
attacker) lead to attack (see Figure 2). In cyber-crime, defense software and firewalls act 
in the guardianship role (Harris & Maymi, 2016). According to Décary-Hetú and Dupont 
(2012), attackers target companies’ software and find security weaknesses in software 
while sharing their findings through online forums. Bendovschi (2015) indicated that 
cyber-space has become a platform for an attacker to attack potential targets. 
 
Figure 2. Elements of routine activity theory. 
There is disagreement among scholars on how to apply traditional criminological 
theory to the study of cyber-crime. Some argue that cyber-crime is a new crime which is 
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unique in the sense that the two parties involved may never have contact and, therefore, 
require new analytical approaches. For example, Hollis et al. (2013) and Holt (2017) 
explained the complexity of employing traditional crime theory to cyber-attack crimes. 
Likewise, Holt (2013) described the suitability of RAT to predict some aspects of the 
online crimes but also noted its limitations in other aspects of cyber-crime. However, 
recently, several scholars applied RAT to examine technology-enabled (cyber-attacks) 
attacks (Leukfeldt, 2014; Holt & Bossler, 2014) as an analytical framework to study 
cybercrime and found that RAT elements are more applicable to the study. There is data 
that supports the use of RAT to analyze cyber-crime (Felson 1986, 1987; Felson & Boba, 
2010). RAT has been successfully applied to virtual settings involving social media, 
computer networks, and online gaming.  
The first scholar to effectively apply the principles of RAT to cyber-attack crime 
was Yar in 2005. Yar applied all the main elements of RAT to the virtual world: the 
online-motivated offenders mainly comprised of the hackers, and the targets included 
personal information and proprietary data. In essence, the more time a person spends on 
the Internet, the more likely they may be targeted by the online offenders. As businesses 
utilize Internet, they become potential cyber-attack targets. The enabling environment for 
such online criminal attack activities is accelerated by data which is not secured online. 
Hutchings and Hayes (2009) also examined online activity in relation to phishing, using 
RAT as a theoretical foundation for their explanatory studies. Their quantitative cross-
sectional survey approach revealed that Internet banking users were more often victims of 
cyber-attackers. Also, examining existing survey data in combination with RAT 
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assumptions, Yucedal (2010) compared home users’ and business users’ online 
victimization. In addition to RAT, Yucedal used lifestyle exposure theory for his 
theoretical framework, and he framed his findings in relation to individual perceptions of 
victimization, cyber-crime, and spyware.  
Similarly, applying RAT to cyber-fraud, Pratt et al. (2010) found that 
vulnerability to cyber-attack was a result of online exposure. Reyns (2013) studied 
identify theft using RAT and found that the use of the Internet for banking and also, the 
constant use and forwarding of online messages through emails increased the risk of 
cyber-attacks. Specifically, his findings indicated that the risk for cyber-attack of people 
who regularly use these online facilities is almost 50% higher compared to those who 
rarely use such online services.  
Researchers also used RAT to examine approaches to cyber-crime. For example, 
Chu and Holt (2015) found that attackers use botnets to attack networks and to scan 
vulnerable networks to exploit information. In addition, Chu and Ahn (2010) conducted a 
crucial study regarding cyber-trespass, which showed that hackers do not target 
individuals but go for bigger populations of Internet users where they use botnets to 
attack the computers. Botnets represent groups of computers that are infected (zombies), 
and usually more than one hacker can use the botnets for their own ends (Symantec, 
2014). Zombies created by attackers are used to carry out large volume of DoS attacks. 
Chu et al. (2010) advocated for the application of RAT to these cyber-crimes.  
The Symantec (2014) study and the findings from Chu et al. (2010) fit into the 
components of the RAT: the hackers, in this case, are the motivated offenders or attacker 
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in the study; the potential targets by the cyber-attackers are all the business computers 
which are connected networks; the guards are anti-virus software and intrusion detection 
systems that are installed on business computers. In other words, there are various ways 
to tailor RAT to suit the Internet environment when analyzing cyber-attacks.  
Leukfeldt and Yar (2016) studied the suitability of RAT in explaining cyber-
attacks. According to their findings, they revealed that some aspects of RAT better allow 
for an understanding of cyber-attack crime than others. Just as financial values are 
especially likely to play a role in on-line offense, visibility clearly plays a role in cyber-
crime victimization. Therefore, value and visibility, as discussed by Leukfeldt and Yar, 
reflect an important aspect of business sector targeted studies.  
Application to DoS attacks. I employed the components of RAT that examine 
attackers, attack targets (business sector as a target and business assets and revenue as a 
target), and the victim (duration of attack and financial damage). The intention is to apply 
RAT in a manner that suits the environment of DoS attacks to develop more measures of 
linking intent with attractiveness through an extended examination of DoS targeted 
attacks. 
While RAT is valuable for examining the attractiveness of targets that could result 
in an attack, RCT complements RAT by recognizing that the occurrence of crime is a 
progressive outcome—not a one-time decision—facilitated by the interaction of potential 
offenders and potential victims, as well as the tradeoffs of opportunity, situational factors, 
and constraints to the crime committed (Cornish & Clarke, 2008).  
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Rational Choice Theory (RCT) 
According to Jennings and Beaudry-Cyr (2014), RCT is one of the most 
fundamental criminological theories, establishing that the process of rational decision 
making enables people to independently decide to take part in criminal activities. 
Essentially, people act rationally by measuring the advantages and disadvantages of 
participating in criminal activities to find the most advantageous move. Should the 
advantages of committing a crime outweigh the disadvantages, then criminals will decide 
to take part. 
According to Hostettler (2011), the origins of RCT date back to the 18th century 
and the utilitarian social philosopher, Cesare Beccaria, who examined the role of people’s 
perceptions of pain and pleasure in their decision making. Since Beccaria’s original 
influence on RCT, the theory has been extended (Freilich, 2015). A variety of theorists 
contributed to the establishment of RCT, including Homans (1961), who created a basic 
theoretical framework associated with the exchange theory derived from behaviorist 
psychology and analyzed how people carry out their activities. Blau (1964), Coleman 
(1973), and Cook (1977) expanded Homan’s work and made RCT applicable to math 
application. Until recently, RCT has been the leading method within the social sciences 
of conceptualizing the actions of people. 
There are various approaches to RCT because there are numerous variations of 
the theory customized for different fields. Claude and Siponen (2014) observed that these 
variations of RCT had been put into various uses in different fields such as criminology, 
political science, sociology, and even the field of economics. Regardless of the field in 
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which RCTs were established, they were based on a common assumption of differences 
in rationality, starting with total rationality, bounded rationality, and the systematic 
rationality to social rationality. Participants seek to fully utilize their resources when 
committing their crime by depending on the knowledge they have. Attackers usually have 
their own projections, and they work their way out to establish the hidden facts through 
their various objectively misconstrued but sensible efforts 
While RCT is used in many fields, it has been a dominating paradigm in 
Economics, where it is referred to as the neoclassical paradigm. Although RCT has been 
tremendously criticized, including critiques of its empirical and conceptual limitations 
(Burns & Roszkowska, 2016), it continues to be used in economic research. Apart from 
economics, RCT is also largely used in criminology (Steele, 2016). 
Application to crime. RCT first was used in criminology studies in 1970s, 
drawing on Becker’s (1968) conceptualization of RCT as a way to examine attackers’ 
decisions of whether or not to attack. Indeed, the classical criminological theory was 
founded on the basic principle of actions and decisions that are taken by an individual. 
The theory of rational choice is meant to explain how people make their choices; it 
highlights that crime is a matter of choice that is intended for benefiting the attacker. 
According to RCT, attackers commit a crime after analyzing their options and making a 
decision to commit the crime. Cornish and Clarke (2008) noted that individuals 
committing crimes make rational decisions prior to making their moves. Attackers are 
active decision makers in the process of evaluating alternatives, which indicates that 
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attackers are criminals who evaluate rational factors to decide whether and how to 
commit crimes (Cornish & Clarke, 2008). 
Initial studies in criminology using RCT received empirical backing from many 
researchers (D'arcy & Hovav, 2009; Ransbotham & Mitra, 2009; Wilson & Herrnstein, 
1985). When RCT was still under development, its sole purpose was to explain particular 
types of crime. This was the main intention of Cornish and Clarke during its development 
when it received their support for studying sexual harassment cases, theft, and academic 
fraud (Exum & Layana, 2016). In the 1980s, Clarke and Cornish (1985) developed three 
lenses, which they elaborated on a year later (Cornish and Clarke, 1986), through which 
to view human criminal behaviors.  
First, crime would be committed by people who perceived the real value in those 
acts of crime; they would commit a crime if they saw more pros than cons in their act. As 
noted by Steele (2016), the criminal act involves a process of making decisions to 
establish advantages and disadvantages, and the decision-making process is often 
hampered by the insufficient or lack of information regarding those acts of crime.  
Second, decisions about committing crimes are made based on sets of information 
and variations in that information. This focus highlighted situations or frameworks of acts 
of crime as opposed to focusing the attention on specific people. The focus also allowed 
for getting idiosyncrasies of various requirements that came in line with the crime.  
Third, criminal acts hinge on decisions made by a particular person in order for 
them to take part in committing a crime. The attacker decides to take part in criminal 
activities or not through the process of criminal involvement in which the decision had to 
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be made from a substantially informed position. This process of decision making does not 
rely on an individual’s character; instead, it relies on various levels of information. More 
recently, Burns and Roszkowska (2016) updated the three components of RCT: agent, 
accessibility to the target, and the opportunity to take action. These components are 
similar to the RAT elements of offenders, suitable targets, and absence of guardian.  
In 2006, Buldas, Laud, Priisalu, Saarepera, and Willemson created a sequence of 
reasoning to analyze an attacker’s decisions. They postulated that any rational attacker 
would not go through with committing that crime if it was not beneficial to them. Again, 
they stated that attackers will always choose the approaches that will result in the greatest 
rewards. In their model of their attacker’s thinking process, Buldas et al. argued that the 
attacker needs to have an idea of all his measures and then applies a combination of his 
measures to establish a strategic attacking plan. Attackers then assess the profitability of 
their plans to see if they will move forward with them. The attackers decide to take part 
in the attack as a game. At this point, they put in place all the necessary requirements and 
launch their assault on the given system.  
Cornish and Clarke (2008) contributed to RCT by stating that crime is intended to 
meet attackers’ needs, such as status or money. Attackers must have a motive directing 
their focus. Due to varying levels of crime, attackers commit different crimes based on 
the returns, risks, and purposes of a crime. Thus, the decision to commit an attack is an 
outcome of the factors associated with the nature of each crime. This theoretical view is 
essential in the analysis of an attacker’s rational choice related to the criteria of the 
companies targeted, the method of attack, and the ability to beat the security 
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countermeasures already in place. The RCT theory can serve as a framework to address 
the decision of which targets to choose in cyber-attacks. 
Application to cyber-crime. Cyber-crime is often quite distinct from a normal 
crime whether the attack is on physical entities or targeting information systems, and as 
result, it can be difficult to examine or predict. Attackers have countless ways of 
launching attacks by involving their rational thinking; hackers weigh several options and 
are very methodical when they are carrying out their operations with caution. As such, 
using RCT to examine cyber-crime can be challenging. However, there are various 
criminal and economic types of RCTs that cyber-security researchers used (Paternoster, 
Jaynes, & Wilson, 2017). For example, Bachmann (2010) used RCT to study the activity 
of cyber-attackers, measuring cyber-interruption and malicious code dissemination 
activities as a way to examine cyber-attacker decision-making activities. Bachmann used 
analysis to test the effect of rationality and risk propensity (independent variable) on the 
total amount of hacking incidents (dependent variable). 
Similarly, using RCT, Hutchings (2014) found that most attackers commit cyber-
crimes because they are more motivated by the thought that they cannot be arrested. 
These attackers sacrifice their time and engage in the crime only to the point when they 
deem it to be no longer beneficial. The benefits that come from committing attacks vary 
depending on the nature of the crime; common offenses usually come with financial 
benefits. 
Mandelcorn, Modarres, and Mosleh (2016) developed an RCT-informed cyber-
attack model, which examined cyber-attacks and their relationship with criminology 
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theory. They found that the random attacks they studied were very opportunistic in 
nature, and they were carried out without a plan, unlike the planned attacks which were 
very strategic and very deliberate. The planned attacks usually involved the attackers 
choosing targets and outcomes, such as targeting financial sector by denying access and 
further acquiring the confidential information. According to Mandelcorn et al.’s 
implementation of cyber-security should be carried out from an attacker’s point of view. 
Their model focused on the usefulness of RCT in understanding the attacker's simple 
goals and decision-making process.  
Application to DoS attacks. Cyber-attack with DoS is a relatively new 
phenomenon, which is still under researched due to its complexity. However, RCT is 
well-suited to studying DoS attacks because attackers, who likely have everything needed 
for an attack at their disposal, employ rational thinking to determine the approach that is 
likely to lead to the best results. This study used RCT as a theoretical approach in order to 
understand targeted business sector attacks with DoS. Specifically, RCT provided a 
framework for analyzing the patterns of attack rates in relation to business sectors and 
their values, offering insight into how attackers choose their targets in relation to 
expected financial benefits.  
Combining two theories. RAT and RCT have, for some time, added value to the 
theoretical understanding of the various forms of cyber-crimes. Researchers used the 
theories as tools of analyses to examine the motivations of cyber-crimes through their 
propositions that when a motivated offender, suitable target, and lack of a capable 
guardian converge at a particular time, then cyber-attacks are likely to take place.  
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Combining RAT and RCT expanded the scope of understanding of the topic. 
Specifically, the focus of RAT is on the required components for an attack to take place 
(i.e., attacker, target, and lack of security) while the focus of RCT is on the rational 
choices in which the attacker weighs the odds and considers the costs and the benefits. 
Although RAT is suitable for a large scale or a macro level, RCT is more suitable for the 
small or micro level.  
There are various models of RAT and RCT that researchers used to analyze 
crime. The model used in this study focused on the targets of DoS attacks; it assumed that 
it is possible to apply the RAT and RCT models used to study crime to cyber-crime. The 
rationale for employing two theories in this study was that combining two theories can 
explain how DoS attacks target specific business sectors and can contribute to a better 
awareness of attack in relation to costs and benefits. Two theories, with their variations, 
can be used as multi-agent modeling to examine cyber-attack variants.  
Summary and Conclusions 
 In Chapter 2, I reviewed the literature that supports the problem statement and 
the theoretical foundation as stated in Chapter 1. I discussed the literature on cyber-
attacks, cyber-security, targeted attacks, attack metrics, and the theoretical framework for 
this study. In addition to the underlying literature on the historical and theoretical 
background for this DoS attack inquiry, this review included several other references and 
resources. Harris and Maymi (2016) and Conrad et al. (2015) noted that attackers (which 
can be script kiddies, crackers, or hackers) used DoS attacks to consume bandwidth and 
to bypass firewall and IDSs and IPSs. The dynamic nature and complexities of attack 
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systems make it difficult to protect companies from DoS attackers. Attackers often use 
reconnaissance techniques to gather as much information about a target’s system as 
possible, which could include searching for information using web browsers, using 
particular tools to send packets to spot hosts, and detecting services run on the target 
computers. The possible dangers of these attacks are network communications 
interruptions and cyber-security breaches. Targeted attacks may operate to maximize 
attackers’ opportunity to prevent access (Harris & Maymi, 2019; Stewart et al., 2015). 
Some researchers of DoS attacks (Conrad et al., 2015; Harris & Maymi, 2016; 
Mahjabin et al., 2017) examined categories of attacks, techniques of attackers, defense 
mechanisms against attacks, and motivations of attacks. However, studies with different 
conclusions exist within the DoS targeted attack literature (e.g., Alomari et al., 2012; 
Bendovschi, 2015; Yu, 2014). Several researchers examined the relationship between 
business sector and DoS attacks. However, discrepancies exist as a result of metholodical 
diffirences; failure to recognize the need to use the business sector as an independent 
variable. The rate, duration, and financial damages were not specifically accounted for in 
these correlational studies. Recently, Bendovschi et al. (2016), Leukfeldt and Yar (2016), 
and O’Leary et al. (2017) endeavored to address the relationships between DoS targeted 
attack and business sector. With the exception of these three studies, there is a gap in the 
research literature whether attackers target some business sectors with DoS more than 
they target others and on whether there is a relationship between targeted attacks and a 
company’s generated revenues and assets.  
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In Chapter 3, I discuss the purpose of quantitative research and the rationale for 
choosing this research approach. I include a description of the research design selected 
for this investigation. Most significantly, Chapter 3 includes the details of how the 
researcher determined differences among business sectors in attack rates, duration of 
attacks, and financial damages resulting from attacks and determined the relationship 
between company assets and revenues and the duration of attacks as well as the 
relationship between company assets and revenues and the financial damages resulting 
from attacks. The chapter includes a detailed explanation of, and justification for, the 
research design, including data collection, data analysis, and ethical considerations. 
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Chapter 3: Research Method 
The literature review in Chapter 2 included an examination and comparison of 
various types of DoS attacks, malicious activities and motivations that intensified over 
time, existing research on DoS attacks, and the theoretical foundation for this study. 
Although researchers provided information about cyber-security, gaps exist in the 
literature regarding targeted attacks on companies with DoS and target attractiveness in 
relation to business sectors and values. In this study, I conducted the research to fill the 
gap. This chapter includes a discussion on the research method, study design and rational, 
sampling and sample procedures, instrument design, data collection, and data analysis. 
As research is a process of collecting, analyzing, and interpreting data to 
understand events and uncover new information (Williman, 2011), it requires an 
appropriate methodology. To select an applicable method of inquiry described by its 
procedure (Lapan, Quartaroli, & Riemer, 2012) and to gain reliable and valid results to 
answer the research questions for a study of DoS attacks, the researcher examined and 
compared various theoretical methods of inquiry and selected a quantitative method. I 
used a quantitative, nonexperimental methodology to investigate the patterns that could 
explain how attackers collectively target business sectors and companies with DoS 
attacks. In order to include enough incidents of successful DoS attacks to allow the 
researcher to draw conclusions, the researcher included DoS attacks that occurred during 
the 19-year time span from 2000–2019. This provided enough information to determine 
differences among the five sectors and to examine the relationships between companies’ 
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assets and revenues and duration of attacks as well as the financial damages resulting 
from attacks. I used the quantitative research method to answer the research questions.  
Research Design and Rational 
Researchers may choose qualitative or quantitative research approaches 
(Singleton & Straits, 2017). Quantitative designs include survey research, experimental, 
quasi-experimental, nonexperimental, correlational and causal-comparative designs 
(Turner, Balmer, & Coverdale, 2013). In nonexperimental designs, researchers can utilize 
correlational design to identify the relationship between variables (Turner et al., 2013) 
and examine variables using numerical or statistics (Holosko, Jolivette, & Houchins, 
2014). I selected a quantitative analysis approach for this study.  
Utilizing a quantitative approach, I also examined the relationship between 
company assets and revenues and the duration of attacks and relationship between 
company assets and revenues and the financial damages resulting from attacks. I 
compiled and analyzed archival data for attack rates, duration, and damages between 
2000 to 2019. I analyzed the data to test the hypotheses generated by the research 
questions.  
The research design for this study on DoS attacks was nonexperimental. 
Nonexperimental research designs are suitable for studies that involve no manipulation of 
the independent variable (Carter & Lubinsky, 2016), no control, and no randomization. 
When randomization and manipulation of variables is not possible, ex post facto design is 
useful to examine the differences and relationship between variables (Ary, et al., 2010). 
The focus of these designs is on measuring independent and dependent variables and 
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determining relationships among variables. The goal is to describe phenomena and to 
explore and explain relationships among variables (Edmonds & Kennedy, 2013).  
I used a dataset compiled from archival reports that include other scholars’ 
research, as well as reports from network administrators, information security officers, 
government agencies, and private companies. The dataset was also compiled from 
incident reports on companies obtained from online, publicly accessible incident and 
crime reports from 2000 to 2019. Compared with survey research, utilizing a dataset 
created from archival data has the advantage of increased accuracy and objectivity. The 
major sources of the data for this study were: ComputerWorld, McAfee, 
Privacyrights.org, Idtheftcenter.org, IC3, Avtest.org, FBI websites, and Library of 
Congress. After the collection of data, I entered into a computer database. I studied 
differences among business sectors using the Kruskal-Wallis test to evaluate the 
dependent variables across the five sectors. I studied the relationship among assets, 
revenues and duration of attacks as well as the financial damages from attacks using 
Spearman correlational tests. 
Methodology 
The research methodology is a systematic way to investigate the research 
questions and acquire new understanding (Singleton & Straits, 2017). In this 
methodological section, I explain how the Kruskal-Wallis tests and Spearman correlation 
analysis were used to determine the differences of attack rates, duration of attacks, and 
financial damages resulting from attacks among sectors as well as to examine the 
relationship among assets and revenues and the duration of attacks as well as the financial 
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damages from attacks. I then describe how the research questions that derived from the 
theoretical foundation and literature review were tested and how the research was 
conducted. I used quantitative statistical analyses, specifically Kruskal-Wallis tests and 
Spearman correlation, to analyze data (number of attacks, length of attacks, financial 
damages, assets, and revenues) and to answer the research questions so that other 
investigators can replicate the findings. In general, the purpose of a quantitative study is 
to examine hypotheses (Morgan, 2015) using an objective procedure. For more detail, 
this section is organized in the following subsections: population; sampling and sampling 
procedures; procedures for recruitment, participation, and data collection; archival data; 
and instrumentation and operationalization of constructs. 
Population 
The study included the 100 largest U.S. companies within each of the business 
sectors (educational, financial, informational, insurance, and retail sectors) whether they 
experienced DoS attacks between the years of 2000 and 2019 or not. Business sectors and 
companies outside of the United States were excluded.  
Sampling and Sampling Procedures 
Based on Singleton and Straits’ (2017) research approach, I used a systematic 
method to gather data on five business sectors from the United States, as categorized by 
the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS). I compiled a complete 
database of DoS attacks focusing on the 100 companies within each of the business 




I performed a power analysis for the Kruskal-Wallis tests using G*Power 
(McDonald 2014; Perugini, Gallucci, & Costantini, 2018) with f = .25, p =.05, and power 
= .80.  I performed a second power analysis for the Spearman correlations using 
G*Power with f2 = .15, p =.05, power = .80, and number of predictors = 1. The results 
indicated that a total sample size across the five groups should be at least 200 for the 
Kruskal-Wallis tests s and fewer would be required for the correlations.  By including 
100 companies in each sector, the total sample size was 500. This suggests that the 
sample size had a greater than 80% chance of finding significant differences across 
sectors and relationships between financial variables and duration and financial damages 
if they exist in the larger population. 
Procedures for Recruitment, Participation, and Data Collection 
Archival documents refer to existing data recorded or reported information that 
gives researchers valuable sources of measurement (Singleton & Straits, 2017). This 
archival data collection includes: DoS attacks from government and business reports and 
assets and revenues from business report database for the years 2000–2019. I used and 
evaluated the Information on DoS attacks from Symantec and McAfee monitoring 
research databases. Retrieving data sets from online archives and government reports 
involved key word searches using terms such as cyber-attack, network attack, security 
breach, hacker, and DoS attacks. The study involved gathering archival documents, 
studies, and record and incident reports and interpreting them into categories for the five 
business sector types.  
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The data included the following information: (a) DoS attacks, (b) types (names) 
of targeted business sectors, (c) year of attack, (d) financial loss/damages, (e) business 
assets and revenues of attacked business, and (f) duration of attacks. See Table 1 for a 
listing of the data that were compiled to answer each research question along with the 
sources for the data. I used these data (business sector types, value of assets and revenue 
of businesses at the period of the attacks) as the independent variables for this research. 
Asset includes any values owned by business, and revenue is total income of a business 
sector over a specific period or year. For the purpose of the correlation analyses, assets 
and revenues were operationalized as the assets and revenues for the company as reported 
the year of the attack. 
Data extraction involved using the TextEdit application or Microsoft Excel. After 
extracting the data for each year into text format, I uploaded data categorized by financial 
loss due to DoS attacks, sector types, assets, revenues, duration of attack and year into the 
SPSS version 24 system. This procedure was repeated for each year of the data set and 
aggregated across the 19 years included in this study, and I examined whether the data 
correctly fit to the research questions. To avoid bias while extracting information from 
books, articles, and reports, the researcher employed strategies such as examining source 
integrity and reliability. Table 1 includes a summary of the data required to answer each 





Table 1  
Data Types and Sources 
 
Research Question Data  Data Sources  
RQ1: Between 2000–2019, 
were there significant 
differences among business 
sectors in the rate of DoS 
attacks? 
 
Rate of DoS attacks on each 
of 100 companies in each 
industry in the 19-year 
period. 





Arbor network, Norton report, McAFee report, 
NAICS, Privacyrights.org, Idtheftcenter.org, IC3, 
Avtest.org, FBI websites, and Library of 
Congress, U.S. Department of Justice, Carnegie 
Mellon, Computer Security Institute, university 
libraries, Internet, Homeland security, NSA, and 
journals. 
RQ2: Between 2000–2019, 
were there significant 
differences among business 
sectors in the duration of DoS 
attacks?  
 
Duration of DoS attacks in 
19-year period. 





Arbor network, Norton report, McAFee report, 
NAICS, Privacyrights.org, Idtheftcenter.org, IC3, 
Avtest.org, FBI websites, and Library of 
Congress, U.S. Department of Justice, Carnegie 
Mellon, Computer Security Institute, university 
libraries, Internet, Homeland security, NSA, and 
journals. 
RQ3: Between 2000–2019, 
were there significant 
differences among business 
sectors in the financial damage 
per DoS attack?  
Financial damage resulting 
from DoS attacks in 19-year 
period. 




Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 
Bureau of labor statistics, Arbor network, Norton 
report, McAFee report, NAICS, Privacyrights.org, 
Idtheftcenter.org, IC3, Avtest.org, FBI websites, 
and Library of Congress, U.S. Department of 
Justice, Carnegie Mellon, Computer Security 
Institute, university libraries, Internet, Homeland 
security, NSA, and journals. 
RQ4: Between 2000–2019, 
within sectors, were there  
significant relationships 
between company assets 
and/or revenues and duration 
of DoS attacks? 
 
Duration of DoS attacks in 
19-year period. 
Business sector type.  
Company assets and 
revenues.  
 
Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 
Bureau of labor statistics, Arbor network, Norton 
report, McAFee report, NAICS, Privacyrights.org, 
Idtheftcenter.org, IC3, Avtest.org, FBI websites, 
and Library of Congress, U.S. Department of 
Justice, Carnegie Mellon, Computer Security 
Institute, university libraries, Internet, Homeland 
security, NSA, and journals. 
 
RQ5: Between 2000–2019, 
within sectors, were there 
significant relationships 
between company assets 
and/or revenues and the 
financial damage resulting 
from DoS attacks? 
Financial damage resulting 
from DoS attacks in 19-year 
period. 
Business sector type.  
Company assets and 
revenues.  
 
Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 
Bureau of labor statistics, Arbor network, Norton 
report, McAFee report, NAICS, Privacyrights.org, 
Idtheftcenter.org, IC3, Avtest.org, FBI websites, 
and Library of Congress, U.S. Department of 
Justice, Carnegie Mellon, Computer Security 
Institute, university libraries, Internet, Homeland 






I only used secondary data to answer the research questions. As the original data 
collection process is separated from me, my aims and views cannot distort the collected 
data. Data are less likely to be influenced by preconceived notions. Instead, when 
compiling archival data, researchers must ensure completeness, accuracy, accessibility of 
reliable measurements, and in cases of quantitative studies such as this one, 
appropriateness of statistical techniques to analyze the compiled data.   
Archival/available data studies compile data from a variety of different types of 
documents (Moore, Salter, Stanley, & Tamboukou, 2017). These available data include 
public and private documents and incident reports. Compared with a survey study, 
creating an archival dataset has the advantage of increased accuracy. Business leaders can 
omit valuable information when responding to surveys for fear of losing customer trust 
and potential client investments (White, 2016). Archival research reduces the likelihood 
such omissions because it relies on data that were submitted to the federal government, 
for which there are serious legal consequences to falsification or omission. Every method 
of data collection has drawbacks and there are several advantages and problems related to 
the use of available data (Singleton & Straits, 2017). For example, in cases where the 
response rate is poor and past events need reexamining, using existing archival data 
appears to be the most viable option for researchers. To avoid any shortcomings and to 
maintain reliability and validity, I compared across data sources to confirm the integrity 
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of the available data. I checked the compiled data for accuracy by visually inspecting data 
and checking invalid and missing data against the original archival data.  
DoS attack reports on business sectors come from databases of government 
agencies (FBI, Homeland Security), private companies, and the Internet. Both 
government and organizational databases are public domain resources, and no special 
permissions are required for acquisition of such data. I verified (cross-checking, 
evaluating) Internet sites and determined whether the information was from legitimate 
government, organizations, businesses, and institutions sources. 
Instrumentation and Operationalization of Constructs 
Instruments are often used in the data collection procedure as a means of 
measuring research variables (Singleton & Straits, 2017). However, I did not include any 
surveys or similar instruments because archival data were used.  
In this quantitative study, I employ operationalization as defined by Singleton and 
Straits (2017) as the means of defining variables into testable and measurable elements. 
To ensure reliability, I inspected the study to retest the congruency between the 
operational definition and the research questions. I used Kruskal-Wallis tests to determine 
whether there are significant differences across sectors on: rate of attacks, duration of 
attacks, and financial damages resulting from attacks. I also used four Spearman 
correlation analyses to determine whether there is a relationship within a given sector 
between a company’s assets and/or revenues and the duration of attacks as well as the 
financial damages resulting from attacks.   
103 
 
Operationalization of Independent and Dependent Variables 
Rate of DoS attacks. Rate is operationalized as the average number of attacks per 
company in each industry. For the purpose of this study, because it would be nearly 
impossible to come up with a credible total number of companies in the retail industry, 
for example, I examined the 100 companies (as measured by total workforce) in each of 
the five sectors and “rate” referred to the average number attacks on those 100 companies 
in the time period under consideration. 
Duration of DoS attack. Duration was operationalized as the hours and minutes 
that a DoS takes the system offline (block the communication) and that can be enough to 
inflict damage at the target site (NSFOCUS, 2017).   
Financial damage. Damage refers a negative effect on the asset values by 
denying services and it includes tangible losses, lost revenue, and other types of damages 
(Palekiene et al., 2014). For this study damages were operationalized as the 
monetary value of losses caused by DoS online business interruption.   
Sector. Five business sectors were included in this analysis: educational, 
financial, informational, insurance, and retail. 
Asset. An asset is everything of monetary value retained by a business that is 
grouped as capital/fixed, current, tangible or intangible and stated in terms of their cash 
value on financial accounts (The Farlex Financial Dictionary, 2017). 
Revenue. Revenue is the total amount of income that a business sector generated 
from sale of goods and services during a specific period or the amount, in monetary unit, 
received during in a given time (Carcello, 2008). 
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Data Analysis Plan 
Scholars conduct both primary and secondary research. Secondary research 
depends on existing data sources collected by others for various objectives (Anderson & 
Paterson, 2015). I used two analytical methods to test the hypotheses about cyber-security 
attacks with DoS. In the first analysis, I tested differences across sectors in DoS attack 
rates, duration of attacks, and financial damages resulting from the attacks for the period 
from 2000 to 2019. The second phase of analysis included determining whether there was 
a statistically significant relationship between company assets and/or revenues and 
duration of DoS attacks and the financial damage resulting from DoS attacks within the 
period from 2000 to 2019. Table 2 includes the data analysis plan, indicating the 
dependent and independent variables for each research question as well as the statistical 




Table 2  
Summary of Data Analysis Approach Per Research Question 
 
Research Questions  Independent 
Variable(s) 
Dependent Variable(s) Analysis 
RQ1: Between 2000–
2019, were there 
significant differences 
among business sectors 
in the rate of DoS 
attacks? 
 








Rate of DoS attacks 
from databases (IC3, 
FBI, The U.S. Bureau 
of Labor Statistics and 
U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, 
journals) tracking 
number of attacks in 
each sector type  
 
 
Kruskal-Wallis tests with 
4 categories (insurance 
excluded) and rate of DoS 
attacks on each company 
as DV. 
RQ2: Between 2000–
2019, were there  
significant differences 
among business sectors 
in the duration of DoS 
attacks?  
 
Business sector Duration of DoS 
attacks from 
databases tracking 
number of attacks in 
relation to value of 
assets held per 
employee within each 
sector (IV) 
 
Kruskal-Wallis tests with 4 
categories (insurance 
excluded) and Duration of 
DoS attacks as DV  
RQ3: Between 2000–
2019, were there 
significant differences 
among business sectors 
in the financial damage 
per DoS attack?  
Business sector  Financial damages from 
DoS attacks from 
databases tracking 
number of attacks in 
relation to revenue at the 
time of the attack (IV) 
 
Kruskal-Wallis tests with 4 
categories (insurance 
excluded) and Financial 
Damages resulting from DoS 
attacks as DV  
RQ4: Between 2000–
2019, within sectors, 
were there significant 
relationships between 
company assets and/or 
revenues and duration 






Value of assets  
 
Revenue of 
businesses at the 
period of attacks  
 
Financial damages due to 
DoS attacks. 
Eight Spearman rank-order 
correlations (rs), two for each 
sector (insurance excluded), 
Value of Assets and Revenues 




2019, within sectors, 
were there significant 
relationships between 
company assets and/or 
revenues and the 
financial damage 




Value of assets  
 
Revenue of 
businesses at the 
period of attacks   
 Eight Spearman rank-order 
correlations (rs), two for each 
sector (insurance excluded) 
Value of Assets and Revenues 
as IVs and financial damage 






Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) is an analysis used to evaluate statistical 
differences. This study originally planned to use ANOVA to determine which of the 
differences among the variables were significant. Using this test allows a researcher to 
test whether means are statistically different from each other. The closer in value the 
means are, the more likely the assumption of equal means will be true when conducting 
the test. However, there was a lack of normal distribution across business sectors. Thus, 
for the first, second, and third research questions, I used the Kruskal-Wallis test, a 
nonparametric test that can be used as alternative to the one-way ANOVA when groups 
of independent variables are not equal in population. While previous research has 
suggested that the financial services sector might be more subject to DoS attacks (Tariq, 
2018), I used the post hoc tests to looks at all possible differences among the five sectors. 
Researchers (DePoy & Gitlin, 2011; Hinton, McMurray, & Brownlow, 2014) use 
an error bar plot prior to the independent sample test as a preliminary determination of 
whether there is no difference in the means and variances between the groups. The x axis 
represents the sectors (educational, financial, informational, insurance, and retail), and 
the y axis represents the mean value of the dependent variable. In each error bar, the dot 
represents the mean of the group. Reading the mean involves placing a horizontal line 
across to the left to the y axis and reading the value for that group. The vertical distance 





Kruskal-Wallis test is used to identify whether there are statistically significant 
differences among independent and dependent variables. Kruskal-Wallis H test is a 
nonparametric test that is used to determine significant differences on continuous 
dependent variable by categorizing independent variable when the requirements are not 
met for one -way ANOVAs.  
Kruskal-Wallis assumption of variance indicate whether the difference in the level 
of variance between the two groups is significant using an H test. In addition, each 
dependent variable was examined for violations of normality and outliers. Normality was 
evaluated by measuring skewness and kurtosis for each quantitative variable. Violations 
of normality were corrected, through a transformation of the nonnormal variable and/or 
by removing outliers from the data base. Testing the hypotheses involves using a p < .05 
level of significance (Neuman, 2011). 
For Research Question 1, Research Question 2, and Research Question 3, the 
independent variable was business sector (educational, financial, informational, 
insurance, and retail). The dependent variables were rate of DoS target attacks for the 
period from 2000-2019, the duration of the attacks, and the financial damages resulting 
from these attacks. Tajalizadehkhoob et al. (2014) and Tariq (2018) demonstrated some 
businesses are more attractive for DoS attack actors than others. For example, gathering 
data from secondary sources from the period of 2010-2018 and utilizing descriptive 
statistics, Tariq indicated that financial services were targeted with DoS attacks more 
than other institutions. Adebiaye, Alryalat, and Owusu (2016) examined financial 
damages from cyber-crime, using financial losses as a dependent variable and cybercrime 
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as an independent variable. This study adds to the existing research by examining 
differences of rates, duration, and financial damages of DoS attacks over a 19-year period 
among the business sectors.  
Correlation 
 Correlation analysis distinguishes which variables impact the dependent variable 
of interest and examines how well a model predicts a dependent variable. It is used to 
identify the relationship between a dependent and one or more independent variables and 
explore the forms of these relationships (Singleton & Straits, 2017). The study analyzed 
the hypotheses for Research Questions 4 and 5 using correlation analysis (Spearman’s 
correlational coefficient). Spearman’s correlational analysis measures the degree of 
relationship between variables.  
I tested these relationships for each business sector: educational, financial, 
informational, and retail. Insurance was included in the overall correlations, but a 
separate correlation for insurance could not be calculated because there were only two 
cases of DoS attacks on insurance companies. Testing the strength and direction of the 
relationship took place at an a < .05 level of significance. A p value of p < .05 indicates 
that the researcher can reject the null hypothesis. 
Research Questions 4 and 5 consider whether a target’s financial value was a 
factor in making companies suitable and attractive targets for motivated attackers. In 
other words, did having high values of assets and high-generated revenues make certain 
companies more attractive to attackers and, therefore, more likely to be targeted with 
long attacks that result in financial damages?  
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Tajalizadehkhoob et al. (2014) used RAT to examine four aspects that drive target 
selection attacks: value, portability, visibility, and accessibility. Their research questions 
included whether the high values (richness) of the sector attracted more companies to be 
targeted by attack. They employed regression analysis and Spearman’s correlational test 
to determine metrics for per week attacks; also, they calculated the average of the attacks 
from a ranked database to evaluate how the intensity of attacks related to size.  
The right type of correlation depends upon the quantity of data. While Pearson’s 
correlation is used for parametric tests, Spearman correlation is used for nonparametric 
tests. Spearman correlation tests measure continuous variables that have failed the 
assumption of the Pearson correlations. I used Spearman rank correlation statistically to 
measure the strength and directions of nonparametric relationships among data. The rs 
and significance (p) values indicate the effect of a variable.  
Threat to Validity 
While qualitative researchers ensure the integrity of their research by 
implementing measures to ensure study credibility and transferability, quantitative 
researchers focus on a study’s internal and external validity as key measures of research 
quality (Nowell, Norris, White, & Moules, 2017; Singleton & Straits, 2017). Employing 
quantitative measures of validity is a significant factor for researchers as their 
engagements help to make certain academic value, meaningful, precise, and properly 
constructed studies. Although scholars may use various definitions to assess the validity 
of their research, essentially, validity relates to the overall accuracy and creditability of a 
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study (Singleton & Straits, 2017). In this study, validity serves to ensure the rigor of 
procedures and processes to ensure and minimize errors or discrepancies in this work.  
To help achieve reliability in this work, I explained and described every essential 
detail of the inquiry. Issues related to validity might affect the outcome of research results 
or quality of a study. Research results may have internal, external, and/or construct 
validity. Internal validity refers to the researcher’s ability to form inferences (Sikorskii & 
Noble, 2013) or to legitimately, effectively, and accurately measure what they intend to 
measure. On the other hand, external validity rerefers to my ability to generalize or apply 
findings and results to larger populations, groups, or other settings (Singleton & Straits, 
2017).   
In this research, the greatest threat to validity in utilizing and transferring data 
from one database to another was human entry errors. While there is nothing that could 
be done to validate original reports’ correctness by the companies, validity of transferring 
this data into an Excel spreadsheet and later an SPSS database for analysis was ensured 
through a repeated data collection and comparison process. The primary drawback is that 
the previous research data may not have been collected to the researcher’s standard; this 
researcher has no control over how the data were reposted and collected when using 
archived information. The data may be inaccurate or may possibly fail to address certain 
issues. Further, publicly available datasets were used to identify the amount of financial 
damage and the likely duration of attacks. The archival data might not generalize to other 
industries or business sectors in other countries. 
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The issue of validity could affect the result of the research. According to Lakshmi 
and Mohideen (2013), the study upshots may encompass one of the validities (internal or 
external). Through the association of validity and reliability, the researcher reduced 
biases and enhanced the research accuracy by using Singleton and Strait’s (2017) and 
Neuman’s (2011) methods and by double checking the archival data and evaluation 
techniques. Additional analysis of the data sampling frames and methods and research 
dealing with the accuracy of the statistics appears in Chapter 4.  
External Validity  
In a quantitative study, threats to external validity are any elements within the 
research that lessens the generalizability. As the external validity is the extent to which 
the outcome of a research can be generalized (Avellar et al., 2016), it is important to state 
that all obtainable data were gathered to address the research questions. To protect their 
confidentiality, some companies targeted by attacks may have been unwilling to report all 
types of cyber-attacks. Unreported incident variable might be significant for analysis. 
Targeted attacked data is limited only to United States companies, which limits the 
generalizability of the data. The validation procedure included collecting and analyzing 
data to evaluate the correctness of a method. Achieving external validity for outcomes 
that may not be generalizable to other situations with various company levels is 
challenging. Balancing conflicting and dynamic occurrences within the data set is also 
difficult. Thus, using multiple types of analyses to examine the same data and eliminate 
all threats to external validity that intermingle with independent valuables may have 




An internal threat to validity is the process of archival data collection methods 
and ensuring its validity. This study was designed to remove the possibility that variables 
other than any independent variables alter dependent variables. As internal validity is a 
means to evaluate if research is complete, an appropriate measure was taken to avoid 
confounding variables (Avellar et al., 2016).  
The goal of this study was to systematically analyze the data and correctly move 
from measurements to conclusions. Internal validity refers to a researcher’s ability to 
effectively and precisely measure what they anticipated to measure. Internal validity 
associates to the congruency of research results (Singleton & Straits, 2017). Use of 
archival data sets can provide some significant benefits to reduce threats to internal 
validity. In this study, the researcher managed threats to internal validity by relying on a 
governmental database for data collection that was appropriate for evaluating and 
examining DoS attacks. Due to varying U.S. states’ reporting and disclosure laws, there 
is no single repository that includes comprehensive information about all DoS attacks, 
damages, and durations. I employed ex post facto research, which is a type of 
nonexperimental research in which there is no ability to control for extraneous 
variables as the research happens after the fact. I determined whether the duration of 
DoS attacks is strongly correlated with higher business values (assets and revenues) 
and whether the financial damages from attacks is strongly correlated with higher 
business values (assets and revenues). I addressed the limitations of ex post facto and 
correlational research in terms of the inability to measure or infer causality from 
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statistical association or differences and the inability to control for extraneous variables 
that may contribute to the relationships or comparisons of interest. Greater effort was 
given to double checking to exclude extraneous variables such as selection, history, and 
selection-maturation in this study. 
Construct Validity 
Threat to construct validity can occur from the selection of independent variables 
and the choice of dependent variables. As construct validity is the most multifaceted and 
complex, statistical data analysis techniques were designed to measure the data in relation 
to the research questions as they were intended to be measured (Singleton & Straits, 
2017). Construct validity has been the center of theoretical and empirical consideration in 
several fields of studies (Singleton & Straits, 2017). Researchers use construct validity to 
examine correlations between an intended measure of a construct and other measures that 
must be theoretically aligned. To simplify the account construct validity ascertained by 
using delineations and measurement processes for selected variables, ensuring internal 
validity requires extraneous variables to need be controlled and confound variable be 
excluded. 
Ethical Procedures 
Ethical research requires the pursuit of the overall principles of scientific research 
(Singleton & Straits, 2017); as such, this research project adhered to Walden University’s 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) parameters. Accessing the existing data online does not 
require consent from the owner of the selected data. All secondary data from CSI, 
Privacyrights.org, FBI Incident/Crime Reports, and other databases are public domain. 
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The compiled data on targeted business sectors with DoS attack are from the public 
domain. This research does not include personal identifiers to identify individuals. An 
online available dataset does not require preexisting arrangement with the data originator 
to provide secure mechanism for data usage. Resource interpretation is bounded by the 
study. I conducted a comprehensive literature review to show that the archival data that 
are publicly accessible have not already been analyzed.  
Summary 
This chapter included a discussion of the components of compiling and analyzing 
the data for this DoS attack study. This chapter included information on the quantitative 
design and research convention. I demonstrated that a quantitative approach produced the 
best and most accurate data for a study on DoS attacks. The focus of this section was on 
describing the procedural phases that took place in the study. Using multiple analysis 
methods resolved the issues of validity and reliability and helped maintain the quality of 
research. The chapter included a discussion on the collection and analysis methods of 
archival data on DoS attacks and an arrangement for selecting companies. The aim of 
using companies as the unit of analysis was to present findings that are valuable to 
organizational leaders in comparing, measuring, and evaluating their targeted values and 
strengthening their defense systems. Chapter 4 presents the result of this study. 
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Chapter 4: Results  
Introduction 
The purpose of this quantitative study was to examine differences in rates and 
severity (in terms of duration of attacks and financial damages resulting from attacks) of 
DoS attacks across business sectors (RQ1, RQ2, RQ3) and to determine the relationship 
between a company’s assets and/or revenues and duration of the attack (RQ4) and the 
relationship between a company’s assets and/or revenues and the financial damages from 
an attack (RQ5). I implemented a quantitative, nonexperimental research design using 
archival data from 100 companies to answer the guiding research questions. To examine 
the first three research questions, I studied the overall differences across sectors in the 
attack rates, attack duration, and financial damages resulting from DoS attacks. To 
examine the remaining two research questions for this study, I studied the relationship 
between company assets/revenues and the duration of attacks as well as the relationship 
between company assets/revenues and the financial damages resulting from DoS attacks. 
I used an ex post facto data search to develop the dataset. To perform the analysis, I 
compiled the data on DoS attacks from websites, journals, and books in the form of an 
Excel text file and imported the Excel text file into SPSS. 
I applied two analytical techniques for this study to test the hypotheses. To test 
the first three hypotheses, I examined the differences among sectors (independent 
variable) in the rate of, duration of, and financial loss from DoS attacks (dependent 
variables). The proposal called for using 1-way ANOVAs to answer these research 
questions. As part of ANOVA testing, it was found that the data violated the assumption 
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of normality; therefore, Kruskal-Wallis tests, a nonparametric alternative to ANOVA, 
were substituted. To test the other hypotheses, I examined the relationship between the 
dependent variables and company assets and/or revenues using correlation analysis. 
Because these questions also employed data that violated the assumption of normality, 
Spearman rank-order correlation was substituted for Pearson product-moment 
correlation.  
For this study, I examined five research questions and hypotheses. For the first 
and the second research questions, I examined the differences in the rate and duration of 
DoS attacks among five business sectors, in the aggregate from the period 2000–2019. 
For the third research question, I examined the differences in the financial damage 
resulting from DoS attacks across the five business sectors from the period 2000–2019. 
For the fourth and fifth research questions, I examined the relationships between the 
duration of DOS attacks and financial damages resulting from DoS attacks from the 
period 2000–2019 and the value of assets held and revenues generated by the business. In 
this chapter, I describe the data collection process, discusses discrepancies in this process 
compared to what was described in Chapter 3, and includes a discussion of the research 
findings for each of the research questions. Chapter 4 concludes with a summary of the 
results.   
Data Collection 
According to Irwin (2013), there is an increasing trend towards the use of 
secondary analysis. This study follows suit in that it is based on analyzing existing 
archival data, collection methods, and analysis techniques. I compiled the existing data 
117 
 
from archival datasets that included a total of 100 business/organization sectors that were 
attacked between 2000 and 2019, a period of 19 years. As shown in Table 3, the attacked 
companies were from the following sectors: educational (9%), financial (38%), 
informational (37%), insurance (2%), and retail (14%). Of the total 100 businesses, the 
majority were from the financial and informational sectors, and the fewest were from the 
insurance sector. All organizations were from the United States and were among the 100 
firms from each sector. There were some necessary discrepancies in data collection 
compared to the plan presented in Chapter 3, specifically in the process of data collection 
it became apparent that some business sectors did not report/publish their data. 
Additionally, some resources had conflicting data and sporadic website outages reports. I 
recognize that too much missing data is problematic and can lead to bias; in order to 
minimize the loss of cases due to missing data, I utilized pair-wise rather than list-wise 
deletion. To reduce the missing data on financial loss, I calculated a few companies’ 
revenues based on their yearly generated revenues.  
Table 3  













I utilized secondary data for both the independent and dependent variables. For 
this study, I used G*Power analysis. I examined 500 companies—100 from each sector, 
resulting in a dataset of 100 attacked companies and 400 companies that were not 
attacked. Finally, I applied convenience sampling to choose companies from each sector.  
Descriptive Data 
Table 4 presents the descriptive data for the five dependent variables. The most 
important values in this table are the skew and kurtosis numbers. For all five variables, 
the skew and kurtosis values are well outside the normal range, indicating that the 
variables are not normally distributed. As a result, I used the Kruskal-Wallis test, which 
is the non-parametric equivalent of ANOVA, and Spearman correlations, the non-
parametric equivalent of Pearson correlations, throughout the analyses 
Table 4  
Descriptive Statistics for the Dependent Variables 
 
  Mean  Std. Error Median Mode Std. Dev. 
Cases 0.2 0.02 0 0 0.45 
Duration 284.78 38.67 180 60 376.87 
Assets 284.78 38.67 180 60 376.87 
Revenues 15.21 4.59 2.29 0.08 45.67 
Fin. Damage $9,964,454 $3,403,268 $614,386 $100,000 $32,995,912 
      
  Kurtosis Skewness Range Min. Max. 
Cases 5.68 2.33 3 0 3 
Duration 9.3 2.82 2,155.00 5 2,160.00 
Assets 9.3 2.82 2,155.00 5 2,160.00 
Revenues 54.69 6.76 404.25 0 404.25 





Kruskal-Wallis Analysis: RQs 1, 2, and 3 
I examined companies with one or more attacks in comparison to companies with 
no attacks. I used Kruskal-Wallis to test the null hypothesis for RQ1. Because there were 
only two insurance companies attacked, I conducted the analysis without the insurance 
sector.  
Based on the work of Levene (1960) and Derrick et al. (2018), I rejected the null 
when the p-value was smaller than the alpha level. Kruskal-Wallis uses a two-tailed test 
to determine whether or not the means or counts are significantly different across sectors 
(Snedecor & Cochran, 1983). I used an alpha level of .05 for the tests.  
RQ1:  Between 2000–2019, were there significant differences among business 
sectors in the rate of DoS attacks?  
To examine Research Question 1, I conducted a Kruskal-Wallis test to assess if 
there was a significant difference among business sectors in the rate of attacks between 
2000 and 2019. Kruskal-Wallis requires at least five observations in each cell and so the 
insurance sector could not be included. There is a statistically significant difference in the 
mean rank of attacks among business sectors.  
With insurance excluded, the overall differences among sectors were significant 
(H (3,400) =39.22, p<.001). The Dunn post hoc comparisons indicated that the financial 
and informational sectors are significantly higher in the rate of attacks than the 
educational sector and retail sector. The significance levels for each pairwise comparison 
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appear in Table 6. The null hypothesis is rejected with 95% confidence that the 
differences among the various sectors is not due to random chance.  
Table 5  
The Rate of Attacks 
 
SUMMARY    
 Count Sum Average 
Educational 100 9 0.09 
Financial 100 38 0.38 
Informational 100 37 0.37 
Retail 100 14 0.14 
   H (3,400) =39.22, p<.001 
Table 6  
Kruskal-Wallis Rate of Attacks (Dunn Contrasts, Pairwise p Values.) 
 
 Educational Financial Information  
Financial p<.001    
Informational p<.001 p=.768   
Retail p=.768 p<.001 p<.001  
 
RQ2:  Between 2000–2019, were there significant differences among business 
sectors in the duration of DoS attacks?  
To analyze Research Question 2, I performed a Kruskal-Wallis test to assess if 
there were differences among business sectors in the duration of attacks (Table 7). 
Kruskal-Wallis requires at least five observations in each cell; therefore, I could not 
include the insurance. Excluding the insurance sector, there is a statistically significant 
difference among business sectors in duration of attacks (H(3,98)=10.69, p = 0.014). 
Dunn post hoc contrasts p values for pairwise comparisons appear as Table 8 and indicate 
that the duration of attacks was significantly higher for the educational and informational 
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sectors than for the retail sector or financial sector. The other differences were not 
significant due to the small sample size. The average duration for the educational sector 
was 621 minutes while the average duration for the financial sector was 175.42 minutes, 
and the informational sector and the retail sector had averages of 357.54 minutes and 
286.43 minutes respectively. The null hypothesis is rejected with 95% confidence that the 
variance between the various sectors is not due to random chance. It would be justifiable 
to conclude that durations are significantly longer for educational and informational 
companies than for financial and retail companies.  
Table 7  
Duration 
 
Groups Count Sum Average 
Educational 9 5589 621.00 
Financial 38 6666 175.42 
Informational 37 13229 357.54 
Retail 14 4010 286.43 
  H(3,98)=10.69, p = 0.014 
Table 8  
Kruskal-Wallis Duration of Attacks (Dunn Contrasts, Pairwise p Values.) 
 
 Educational Financial Informational  
Financial p=.171    
Informational p=1 p=.027   
Retail p=1 p<.001 p=1  
 
RQ3:  Between 2000–2019, were there significant differences among business 
sectors in the financial damage per DoS attack?  
To analyze RQ3, I performed a Kruskal-Wallis test to assess if there were 
differences among business sectors in financial loss resulting from attacks (Table 9). 
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Kruskal-Wallis requires at least five observations in each cell; therefore, I omitted the 
insurance sector. There is a statistically significant difference among business sectors, as 
determined by Kruskal-Wallis tests (H(3,92)=20.34, p = .00014). The average financial 
loss for each sector was as follows: the educational sector average loss was $379,828.9; 
the financial sector average loss was $2,183,218; the informational sector average loss 
was $12,046,218, and the retail sector average loss was $28,530,387. I rejected the null 
hypothesis with 95% confidence that the various sectors' differences are not due to 
random chance. Financial damages for informational and retail companies were higher 
than for educational and financial companies. Dunn post hoc contrasts p values for 
pairwise comparisons appear in Table 10 and indicate that the educational sector's 
financial loss was significantly lower than the financial sector, informational sector, or 






Table 9  
Financial Loss 
 
Groups Count Sum Average 
Educational 8 3038631.2 379828.9 
Financial 37 80779073.75 2183218.209 
Informational 34 409571428.8 12046218.49 
Retail 13 370895025.3 28530386.56 
H(3,92)=20.34, p = .00014 
 
Table 10  
Kruskal-Wallis Financial Loss (Dunn Contrasts, Pairwise p Values.) 
 
 Educational Financial Informational  
Financial p=.029    
Informational p=<.001 p=.082   
Retail P<.001 p<.006 p=.163  
     
 
Correlational Analyses: RQs 4 and 5 
I used Correlation analysis for RQs 4 and 5 to measure the degree of a 
relationship between independent and dependent variables and predict the value of the 
variable and how one variable affects another (Ciaburro, 2018). I used Spearman Rank-
order correlation analysis rather than Pearson product-moment correlation to identify the 
relationship's strength or the absence of a relationship between independent and 
dependent variables (Ciaburro, 2018) as the variables displayed a non-normal 
distribution. To consider the relationship between asset/revenue and duration (RQ4) and 
asset/revenue and financial damage (RQ5), I first ran Spearman correlations to determine 
if the sector's asset/revenue correlated to its duration of the attack. Based on this test, I 
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found that asset/revenue correlates to the sector's financial damage because of DoS 
attacks. I tested relationships for each of four business sectors: educational, financial, 
informational, and retail (excluding insurance because there were only two cases). 
Testing the strength and direction of the relationship took place at an a < .05 level of 
significance. A p-value of p < .05 indicated that I can reject the null hypothesis. 
RQ4:  Between 2000–2019, within sectors, were there significant relationships 
between company assets and/or revenues and duration of DoS attacks?  
Due to missing data on assets for five businesses (specifically one from 
educational and four from the informational sector), the dataset for Research Question 4 
included a total of 95 businesses that had been attacked.  
 To answer Research Question 4, I had to decide if there was a relationship 
between the assets/revenues and duration of attack. Table 11 shows the results of the 
correlation for the duration by assets. The negative coefficient (-.247) means that higher 
assets correspond to lower duration. The correlation across all sectors is significant as 
p=.016, meaning that the relationship between assets and duration is significant across 
sectors. Spearman Correlation Analysis was used to measure the degree of a relationship 
between assets and duration of attacks. The Coefficient ranges from +1 to -1, with +1 
representing a positive correlation and -1 representing a negative correlation. One 
company from the educational sector had missing data in financial damage and four 
companies from the informational sector had missing data in the asset and revenue 
variables. Across all sectors, there is a significant negative correlation between duration 
and assets. (rs=-.247, p=.016). Within sectors, there is a significant positive correlation 
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between duration and assets for financial companies (rs=.424, p=.008). The higher the 
assets within the financial sector, the longer the duration of attacks.   
Table 11  
Spearman Correlations: Duration by Assets 
 
Source N Correlation Significance 
Financial 38 .424 .008 
Informational 32 .245 .176 
Retail 14 -.024 .933 
Educational 9 .427 .252 
All Companies 95 -.247 .016 
Note:  No analysis was done for Insurance (N=2). 
The relation between duration and revenue is negative, meaning that when the 
revenue is higher, the duration of attacks tends to decrease (rs=-.162, p=.108) (Table 12). 
This relationship is not significant; therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. H0: 
There wasn’t a significant relationship between company revenues and the duration of 
DoS attacks. 
For duration by revenue, Spearman Correlation Analysis was used to measure the 
degree of a relationship. There was not a significant relationship between duration and 
revenue. Retail is highest in correlation (r s-.438), but not significant (p=.072) due to the 




Table 12  
Spearman Correlations: Duration by Revenue 
 
Source N Correlation Significance 
Financial 37 -.293 .074 
Informational 32 .288 .110 
Retail 13 -.438 .072 
Educational 8 .240 .535 
All 
Companies 
99 -.162 .108 
Note:  No analysis was done for Insurance (N=2). 
 
RQ5:  Between 2000–2019, within sectors, were there significant relationships 
between company assets and/or revenues and the financial damage 
resulting from DoS attacks?  
The relationship between the financial damage and assets is negative, meaning 
that higher assets lead to lower financial damage (Table 13). In addition, the relationship 
is not statistically significant (p=.164), indicating that the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected.  
Table 13  
Correlations: Financial Damage by Assets 
 
Source N Correlation Significance 
Financial 35 -.070 .673 
Informational 32 .423 .016 
Retail 13 .269 .374 
Educational 9 .237 .538 
All 
Companies 
94 .145 .164 
Note:  No analysis was done for Insurance (N=2). 
 
The relationship between financial damages and revenues is positive, meaning 
that higher revenues indicate higher financial damages (rs=.158). However, the results are 
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statistically insignificant (p=.121). The null hypothesis could be accepted. H0: There were 
no significant relationships between company revenues and the financial damage of DoS 
attacks.  
I conducted a Spearman Correlation Analysis of the relationship between 
financial damage by revenue of business sectors (Table 12). There was not a significant 
correlation between financial damage and revenues.  
Table 14  
Correlations: Financial Damages by Revenue 
 
Source N Correlation Significance 
Financial 37 .072 .668 
Informational 31 .200 .273 
Retail 12 .114 .623 
Educational 7 .110 .777 
All Companies 98 .158 .121 
Note:  No analysis was done for Insurance (N=2). 
 
Summary 
The purpose of this chapter was to present the results of the quantitative analyses 
used to test each of the research questions and hypotheses generated for this study. Three 
of the research questions were analyzed using Kruskal-Wallis analyses to find significant 
differences. Spearman correlational analysis was used to examine two of the research 
questions. Four research questions denoted statistically significant results. Specifically, 
for Research Question 1, the outcome indicated that there is a significant difference in the 
rate of attacks between business sectors. The financial and informational sectors are 
significantly higher in the rate of attacks than the educational sector and retail sectors. 
The alternative hypothesis was accepted and the conclusion to this question showed the 
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rate of attacks were different among business sectors. For Research Question 2, the 
results revealed that there is a significant difference in the duration of attacks among 
business sectors. The duration of attacks was significantly higher for the educational and 
informational sectors than for the retail sector or financial sector. For Research Question 
3, the results revealed that there is a significant difference in the financial damage of 
attacks among business sectors. The educational sector's financial loss was significantly 
lower than the financial sector, informational sector, or retail sector. In addition, the loss 
for the retail sector was significantly higher than the loss for the financial sector. 
 In the first, second, and third research questions, the null hypotheses were 
rejected. This indicates there are statistically significant differences in the severity of the 
DoS attacks regarding rate, duration, and financial damage for educational, financial, 
informational, and retail sectors.  
The fourth research question involved looking at the correlations of assets and 
revenues with duration of attacks. The correlation between assets and duration across all 
sectors is negative and significant (rs=-.247, p=.016), meaning lower assets correspond to 
greater duration of attacks. Within sectors, there is a significant positive correlation 
between duration and assets of financial companies (rs=.424, p=.008). As such, greater 
assets correspond to greater duration of DOS attacks for financial companies. There was 
not a significant relationship between duration and revenue.  
The fifth research question involved examining the correlations of assets and 
revenues with financial damages resulting from attacks. There were no significant 
relationships between assets or revenues and financial damages. 
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In Chapter 4, I included an introduction, description of data collection, report of 
data analysis and findings of the study, and the summary of the chapter. Chapter 5 
provides an interpretation of the findings presented in this chapter. Chapter 5 also 
includes discussion, an elucidation of the limitations of the study, implications, and 
recommendations for further research and includes implications for positive social 
change. Finally, Chapter 5 includes conclusions of the study. 
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
In this chapter, I discuss the research findings and offer conclusion and 
recommendations based on these findings. As described in Chapter 1, this study 
contributes to the theoretical understanding of targeted business sector attacks with DoS, 
as existing studies remain limited. At the same time, the advances in Internet technology 
over the last several decades have resulted in ever more cyber-security attacks (Harris & 
Maymi, 2016; Lee, 2013). Targeted DoS attacks have become more sophisticated and 
more challenging to defend against. Existing research has recorded increases in annual 
recurring attacks; however, little research has examined the different rates at which 
business sectors are targeted with DoS attacks, and, at the time of this study, there are 
few or no published research articles on the relationship between the values held and 
generated by the business sectors and DoS attacks. The purpose of the study was to fill 
the gap in literature by exploring DoS attacks in the U.S. from 2000 to 2019, to identify 
significant differences among business sectors in the rate, duration, and financial 
damages/loss resulting from DoS attacks, and to examine the relationships between 
business sectors’ assets/revenues and attack duration as well as financial damages 
resulting from DoS attacks.  
My objective was to answer the five research questions. In addition to conducting 
quantitative analysis to answer these questions, I used Cohen and Felson’s (1979) RAT 
and Cornish and Clarke’s (1987) RCT as theoretical frames for examining the data in 
relation to the research questions. These theoretical models have been valuable in 
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analyzing the attractiveness of particular business sector types and business values, which 
could make them more likely to be targeted.   
The results of the study indicated there is a significant difference among business 
sectors in the rate of DoS attacks, in the duration of attacks, and in financial damages, as 
determined by Kruskal-Wallis tests. The Dunn post hoc comparisons indicated that the 
financial sector and informational sector are significantly higher in rate of attacks than 
the educational sector and retail sector. In addition, the Dunn post hoc comparisons 
indicated that the duration of attacks was significantly higher for the educational sector 
and informational sector than for the retail sector or financial sector. Financial damages 
were significantly higher for the informational and retail sectors than for the educational 
or financial sectors. Spearman correlation analysis was used to measure the degree of a 
relationship between duration of attacks and financial damages and asset/revenues. 
Across all sectors, there is a significant negative correlation between duration of attacks 
and company assets. (rs=-.247, p=.016), and within sectors, there is a significant positive 
correlation between duration of attacks and assets for financial companies (rs=.424, 
p=.008). However, the result indicated no evidence of relationships between revenues and 
duration of attacks or asset/revenue and financial damage resulting from attacks. 
Interpretation of Findings 
I employed quantitative analysis techniques to determine whether there were 
significant differences in rate, duration, and damage of attacks among business sectors 
and to determine whether there was a relationship between assets/revenues and attack 
durations and financial damage resulting from DoS attacks. I designed the quantitative, 
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ex post facto study to answer five research questions. This section is organized to present 
the findings of each of the research questions in relation to existing literature on DoS 
attacks and in relation to the RAT and RCT theoretical foundations that were derived 
from prior criminological studies in order to better understand the motivation of 
attackers. 
Research Question 1 
RQ1: Between 2000–2019, were there significant differences among business 
sectors in the rate of DoS attacks?  
H01: Between 2000–2019, there were no significant differences among business 
sectors in the rate of DoS attacks. 
Ha1: Between 2000–2019, there were significant differences among business 
sectors in the rate of DoS attacks. 
The results of the Kruskal-Wallis test indicated the overall differences among 
sectors were significant (H (3,400) =39.22, p<.001)). The number of cases was highest in 
the financial sector at 38 followed by the informational sector at 37 while retail recorded 
only 14 cases. The null hypothesis is rejected with 95% confidence that the differences 
among the various sectors is not due to random chance. 
With the exception of a few studies (e.g. Bendovschi et al. (2016), Leukfeldt and 
Yar (2016), and O’Leary et al. (2017)), there is a gap in the research literature whether 
attackers target some business sectors with DoS more than they target others. In this 
study, I found that there are statistically significant differences in attack rates among five 
business sectors. The results revealed that the financial sector is the preferred choice 
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among the five sectors for targeting attackers. This could be attributed to Romanosky 
(2016)’s finding that organizations in the financial sector were the most vulnerable to 
attacks. Further, Leukfeldt and Yar (2016) found that online financial business sectors’ 
high visibility plays a role in cyber-crime victimization. The results from this study add 
evidence to the existing literature that suggests financial companies are targeted in DoS 
attacks. 
I interpreted the results from this study according to RAT and RCT theoretical 
frameworks, which indicate that because attacks are not distributed equally, attackers are 
more inclined to attack specific targets. Specifically, the results suggest there is a higher 
motivation for attacks within the financial sector and the informational sector. According 
to Décary-Hetú and Dupont (2012), attackers target companies’ defense weaknesses in 
software. In other words, an attacker uses Internet opportunity (its remoteness of the 
victim) and a lack of cyber security defense in order to target companies. The findings 
from this study could be interpreted as evidence that frequent attacks indicate a lack of 
security defense, allowing for opportunities for attack, which influence attackers’ 
decisions and motivations.  
Research Question 2 
RQ2: Between 2000–2019, were there significant differences among business 
sectors in the duration of DoS attacks?  
H02: Between 2000–2019, there were no significant differences among business 
sectors in the duration of DoS attacks. 
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Ha2: Between 2000–2019, there were significant differences among business 
sectors in the duration of DoS attacks. 
The results of the Kruskal-Wallis test indicated that there is a statistically 
significant difference among business sectors in duration of attacks (H(3,98)=10.69), p = 
0.014). The duration for the informational and educational sectors were significantly 
higher than the duration for financial or retail sectors; however, the other differences 
were not significant due to small sample size. The null hypothesis is rejected with 95% 
confidence that the variance between the various sectors is not due to random chance.  
There is no existing published research on the duration of attacks among business 
sectors. As such, the findings from this study work to fill the gap in the research literature 
about whether some business sectors are more vulnerable to longer DoS attacks. This 
study found that there are statistically significant differences in attack durations. The two 
theoretical frames for this study, RAT and RCT, emphasize the role of attackers’ choices 
and opportunities when making decisions about whether to attack targets. One 
interpretation of the statistically significant differences in duration of attacks among 
business sectors is that offenders chose to attack the educational and informational targets 
for longer periods. In the case of this finding, the theories might be extended to indicate 
that the lack of a capable guardian might lead to longer attacks. 
Research Question 3 
RQ3: Between 2000–2019, were there significant differences among business 
sectors in the financial damage per DoS attack?  
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H03: Between 2000–2019, there were no significant differences among business 
sectors in the financial damage per DoS attack. 
Ha3: Between 2000–2019, there were significant differences among business 
sectors in the financial damage per DoS attack. 
The results of the Kruskal-Wallis test indicated that there is a statistically 
significant difference among business sectors (H(3,100)=18.73, p = .0003). The average 
financial loss for the retail sector and informational sector was higher than the average 
financial loss for other sectors, and the average financial loss for the educational sector 
was significantly lower, likely because educational institutions are not dependent on 
online (Internet) business for their revenues (tuition). The null hypothesis is rejected with 
95% confidence that the differences among the various sectors are not due to random 
chance.  
There were an alarming number of DoS attacks aimed at major U.S. business 
sectors between 2000-2019. These attacks resulted in financial damages for all types of 
businesses, but for specific business sectors the damages were greater. Financial damage 
refers to a negative effect on the asset values by denying services through the DoS attack. 
As companies are highly dependent on an Internet connection, service interruptions can 
interfere with business activities (revenue) and can be devastating to the business. 
According to Arora, Dumar, and Sachdeva (2011), the financial impact of attacks can be 
devastating to a business, and a few hours of network service interruption can be costly to 
a company. Financial damages include tangible losses, lost revenue, and other types of 
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damages (Palekiene et al., 2014). For this study, damages were the monetary value of 
losses caused by DoS online business interruption.  
The results from this study indicated that the retail sector and informational sector 
experienced greater financial damages than other sectors. Because retail sectors are often 
dependent on online sales, service interruptions are likely to result in significant losses. 
The high financial damages caused by attacks could be a motivating factor for attackers. 
The findings could also be interpreted as evidence that certain sectors are vulnerable to 
financial damage. 
Research Question 4 
RQ4: Between 2000–2019, within sectors, were there significant relationships 
between company assets and/or revenues and duration of DoS attacks?  
H04: Between 2000–2019, within sectors, there were no significant relationships 
between company assets and/or revenues and the duration of DoS attacks. 
Ha4: Between 2000–2019, within sectors, there was a significant relationship 
between company assets and the duration of DoS attacks. 
Hb4: Between 2000–2019, within sectors, there was a significant relationship 
between company revenues and the duration of DoS attacks 
The results of the Spearman’s correlation analysis indicated there was a 
significant relationship between duration of attacks and assets. The negative coefficient (-
.247) means that higher assets correspond to lower duration. The correlation across all 
sectors is significant as p=.016, meaning that the relationship between assets and duration 
is significant across sectors. Within sectors, there is a significant positive correlation 
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between duration and assets for financial companies (rs=.424, p=.008); the higher the 
assets within the financial sector, the longer the duration of attacks.   
The relation between duration and revenue is negative, meaning that when the 
revenue is higher the duration of attacks tends to decrease (rs=-.162, p=.108) (Table 9). 
This relationship is not significant and the null hypothesis can be accepted.  
As businesses or industries are categorized according to the type of their 
economic activities, assets and revenues are fundamental elements of business sectors. 
Assets are resources with economic value that the business owns and that are recorded in 
companies’ balance sheets (Siegel, Dauber, & Shim, 2005). In relation to this study, 
Leukfeldt and Yar (2016) noticed that value has a financial character and cyber-attackers 
are interested in assigned value. The concept of a suitable target in RAT is a combination 
of value and opportunity 
According to Cohen and Felson (1979) and Cornish and Clarke (1986), (the 
founders of the research theories RAT and RCT), attackers make a choice to commit a 
crime based on opportunity, a lack of guardian, motivation, and attractiveness of the 
targets. Within the financial sector, there is a significant positive correlation between 
duration of attacks and company assets. The relation indicates that businesses with higher 
assets in the financial sector were the target of longer attacks, which is likely based on the 
attractiveness of the target and the opportunity to attack. In other words, the higher the 
value of the company within the financial sector, the higher the motivation of attackers.  
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Research Questions 5 
RQ5: Between 2000–2019, within sectors, were there significant relationships 
between company assets and/or revenues and the financial damage resulting from 
DoS attacks?  
H05: Between 2000–2019, within sectors, there were no significant relationships 
between company assets and/or revenues and the financial damage of DoS 
attacks. 
Ha5: Between 2000–2019, within sectors, there was a significant relationship 
between company assets and the financial damage resulting from DoS attacks. 
Hb5: Between 2000–2019, within sectors, there was a significant relationship 
between company revenues and the financial damage resulting from DoS attacks. 
The results of the Spearman’s correlational analysis indicated that the relationship 
between financial damages and company assets is negative, meaning that higher assets 
indicate lower financial damages (Table 13). However, the relationship is not statistically 
significant (p=.164); therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
The relationship between financial damages and company revenues is positive, 
meaning that higher revenues indicate higher financial damages (rs=.158). However, the 
results are statistically insignificant (p=.121). The null hypothesis can be accepted. 
Previous published research has not focused on revenues and assets aside from 
confirming that DoS attacks lead to a loss of profits (Anderson et al., 2013). Researchers 
have not investigated the role of financial metrics in determining business sectors and 
target candidates for cyber-attack. Tajalizadehkhoob et al. (2014) drew upon RAT to 
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describe why criminals go after a certain target and examined DoS attacks through the 
lens of the economics of crime, but they did not categorize targets by assets or revenues. 
Based on the findings from this study, I could not reject the null hypotheses in 
relation to assets/revenue and financial damage. However, research that focuses on 
business sector attractiveness and targets, damages, and sector types are valuable to 
creating financial metrics that can help predict the likelihood for attacks. 
According to RAT and RCT, attackers make choices to attack based on target 
attractiveness and opportunity, and they rationally consider the positive or negative 
valuation of potential attack results. Taken together, the results from this study suggest 
that DoS attack rates are higher in the financial sector and that financial companies with 
higher assets experience attacks of a longer duration. The financial sector is likely seen as 
a suitable target that offers opportunities for attacks and positive results for attackers. 
Similarly, the informational sector experienced significantly more attacks of a longer 
duration and resulting in higher financial damages. Again, these findings suggest that 
companies in this sector are seen as suitable targets, offering both attractiveness and 
opportunity to attackers. The educational sector experiences longer durations of attacks 
but the financial damages are lower in comparison to other sectors. Because educational 
sectors are not dependent on online (Internet) business for their revenues (tuition), as 
retail and other sectors are, the financial damage effect is lower, suggesting that the 
motivation for attacks is not purely about (financial) gains but also includes 
considerations of lower risks (weaker defenses). Finally, the retail sector suffered the 
highest financial damages but had lower rates and durations of attacks. These results 
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show that some sectors are more vulnerable to high financial damages but may not be as 
attractive to attackers. 
Limitations of the Study 
The most significant limitation of this study was use of nonparametric tests. The 
proposal called for using 1-way ANOVAs and Pearson correlational analysis to answer 
the research questions, but the data violated the assumption of normality. Kruskal-Wallis 
tests were substituted for ANOVAs, and Spearman rank-order correlation was substituted 
for Pearson product-moment correlation. Nonparametric tests are less robust; as a result, 
null hypotheses should be rejected with caution.  
In addition to sample size of the business sector groups, a limitation of 
nonexperimental quantitative research is lack of ability of the researchers to control the 
atmosphere in which the data were gathered from the archival database. These limitations 
were introduced in Chapter 1, and they allow for recommendations for further studies, 
which will be discussed later in this chapter.  
There is no national database recording information on the rate of attack, duration 
of attack, and financial loss caused by DoS attacks. Collecting complete information 
about targeted business sectors with DoS attacks is not straightforward; some institutions, 
businesses, organizations, and agencies did not make these data publicly available. The 
lack of precise and definite incident reports makes precise equilibrium calculations 
difficult. Finding asset and revenue data, specifically from information companies was a 
challenge. There was the possibility of missing important data (variables). The process of 
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determining the precise rate of attacks, duration of attacks, and financial losses arising 
from DoS can be difficult.  
Collecting all possible data on every attempt of DoS attack from all organizations 
is impractical. As such, the data in this study are limited to five business sectors in the 
U.S. Additionally, the study was limited to U.S. companies that had data on DoS attacks 
analytics and company incident reports for the years 2000-2019 and The data that have 
not been reported and collected limits the study. Due to the shortcoming of resources and 
inconsistent information, this research used various websites. Specifically, the findings of 
this study cannot be generalized outside of the U.S. or outside of the five business sectors 
included in the study design.  
Despite the difficulties of obtaining data and precise reports, this research method 
has more depth of information but less generalization proficiency. Despite the 
challenging process of collecting data, and the resultant limitations, this research may be 
significant to security practitioners and business leaders and contribute new ideas in the 
young cyber security research field.  
Recommendations 
Cyber security attacks have become more problematic and are often bewildering 
because of their increased complexity. It has been difficult to find precise theory and 
protective systems that address the complexity of these attacks. The interconnected nature 
of IT systems has limited the possibility of controlling attacks. Previous research on the 
method and technique of DoS attacks has not yet resulted in a theory of the motivations 
of targeted attacks. Further research is needed that incorporates multiple disciplines, such 
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as sociology, psychology, information systems, and economics in order to comprehend 
the motivations of attackers and targeting metrics and to design appropriate approaches to 
protect businesses and groups against these attacks.  
Due to the difficulty of obtaining reliable data, this study was limited to five 
business sectors, and one of those sectors could not be included in all of the statistical 
tests due to low population size. Further research could include more business sectors and 
more businesses or organizations in the U.S. to ensure the accuracy of the study. Such 
studies might require different data collection procedures. Because DoS attacks are but 
one type of cyber-security threat, it would be worthwhile to replicate this study with 
malware breach attacks and to potentially expand it to include more companies and 
possibly various countries.  
Finally, there are no consistent, unified, and broadly accepted theories in the 
literature about why cyber security attackers attack businesses and there are no clear and 
applicable approaches to protecting business sectors from DoS attacks. Future research 
could employ additional theoretical frames, in addition to RAT and RCT, to study and 
understand the relationship between attackers and defenders.  
This research disclosed several findings resulting in possible professional 
recommendations that security practitioners and business managers may find pertinent. 
The study showed that the financial sector and informational sectors were the most 
targeted business sectors with DoS attacks. Moreover, the retail sector and informational 
sector suffered the largest financial damages. Finally, informational and educational 
sectors experienced the longest duration of attacks. Identifying targeted sectors allows 
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professional to take appropriate countermeasures and to erect extra layers of protection to 
safeguard businesses.  
To overcome the limited use of reported archival public data, researchers need to 
combined research techniques to and aim for a more in-depth inquiry. For example, data 
could be collected from security defenders as well as from attackers to ensure that only 
professionals who met the study’s criteria provided data. Designing and using theory by 
obtaining data on attackers’ tactics and strategies and business’ defensive tactics and 
strategy (between attacker and defender) can be suitable for framing the recursive 
relationship. Accordingly, recommendations for future comprehensive research are as 
follows: examine the larger samples, collect data from attackers, and defenders, include 
all businesses in the study, and consider longitudinal studies.  
Implications 
For two decades, the growth of complex DoS attacks on business sectors has 
corresponded directly with the growth of the Internet and its use within diverse services. 
DoS attacks targeted the availability of services, disrupted online access, disabled 
computer functions, and controlled computing systems remotely (Harris & Maymi, 
2016). Though protecting companies from targeted DoS attacks is a challenging task that 
requires diligence and ingenuity, businesses, organizations, and cyber security 
professionals have the legal obligation to protect network communications and defend 
against financial losses from attackers. Crucial to tackling DoS attacks is not only 
technical know-how but also the ability to identify the most targeted business sectors and 
the metrics of attacks.  
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This study serves as a common starting point for further discussion and 
investigation, while informing a basic and an effective cyber security approach. Leaders 
of cyber security defenders not only need to trace technological advancement of attack 
tools to bridge the gap between attacks and defense but also need to identify which 
business sectors are more targeted (victims) and understand thoroughly the persistent 
motivation for targeted attack metrics. This study offers positive social change that 
impacts business sectors with DoS attacks and the population in general by increasing 
understanding of the motivation behind targeted attacks and improving the protection 
system (countermeasures) of businesses. The information from this research affects social 
change by presenting business leaders with information crucial to decision-making in 
relation to cyber security.    
The nature of the research questions called for a quantitative method of research 
to investigate the problem. Selecting quantitative inquiry for data collection and analysis 
for cyber- security attacks with DoS, targeting companies, and rate of attacks research 
was indispensable as it facilitated the understanding of relationships and associations 
among the variables (Neuman, 2006). The financial metrics that explains how attackers 
collectively target companies with DoS attacks was statistically evaluated. This study 
shows there is a significant difference in the financial damage of attacks among business 
sectors. The implications of financial damage could potentially impact investors and 
cause customer fear.  
In this dissertation, I conducted an analysis of targeted attacks using DoS and a 
cyber security related literature review used combined theories (RAT and RCT) to 
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examine cybercrime as an outcome of a continual interaction between a criminal’s desires 
and target preferences (Cornish & Clarke, 2008). These theories may assist researchers 
and security professionals in considering and identifying the metrics of sectors targeted 
with DoS attacks. 
This research is intended to address the gap in literature through its research 
design, analytical methods, and results. The outcomes of this research are beneficiary to 
business administration and to diverse fields. The findings of this research contribute 
information to agencies and organizations and could trigger scholars to further research 
the issues raised in the study. The findings of the study, that there are significant 
differences in the rate, duration, and financial damages of attacks between business 
sectors and that there is a significant relationship between the duration of attacks and 
assets, have the potential for positive social change on students, researchers, agencies, 
and organizations, which in turn can be utilized to design techniques and program 
mechanism towards understanding the targeting metrics and motivation of security 
attackers. The results from my research analysis have numerous implications for 
measuring and constructing standards for non-traditional forms of research for 
advancements in the cyber security field of study.   
Conclusion 
The exponential growth of Internet technology that enables businesses and 
organizations connectivity across the globe has led to an increase in DoS attacks. DoS 
attacks are formidable techniques that deplete the availability of the targeted companies’ 
networking systems. Since 2000, in the U.S., business sectors were targeted with DoS 
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attacks at an increasing rate of occurrence and cost. Combating cyber-attacks costs 
organizations billions annually. In the U.S. businesses/organizations have experienced the 
burden of DoS attacks. DoS attack threats pose a serious risk to business activities. It was 
important to find and understand differences among business sectors in attack rates, 
duration of attacks, and financial damages as well as the relationship between company 
assets and revenues and the duration of attacks and the financial damages resulting from 
attacks. 
This research was conducted in order to determine whether there were differences 
among business sectors in the rate and duration of attacks and in financial loss/damages 
as a result of DoS attacks. The second aim was to determine whether there were 
relationships between business sector’s assets/revenues and the duration of attacks and 
financial damages as a result of DoS attacks. The analyses resulted in the identification of 
the differences of the rate, duration, and financial damage at which companies in each 
sector are targeted with DoS attacks. Findings from the Kruskal-Wallis test analyses 
indicated statistically significant differences among business sectors in the rate of attacks 
and duration of attacks as well as financial damage caused by DoS attacks. The 
correlation between assets and duration across all sectors is negative and significant 
(rs=.247, p=.016,) except within the financial sector in which there is a significant 
positive correlation between duration of attacks and assets (rs=.424, p=.008). In other 
words, greater assets correspond to a greater duration of DoS attacks. The Spearman’s 
correlation indicated that there was not a significant relationship between duration and 
revenue or assets/revenue and financial damage. 
147 
 
While no one measure can entirely prevent all possible attacks, in order to 
efficiently manage network (online service) accessibility and reduce the rate of attack, 
duration, and financial damages resulting from DoS attack, business managers and cyber 
security professionals should continuously evaluate targeted metrics and implement 
appropriate preemptive measures that reduce the impact of coordinated DoS attacks on 
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